Author: rogerwlawson

Beaufort Administration, Intercede and the Mello Conference

Yesterday I attended the first day of the 2-day Mello investor conference in Derby. There were lots of good presentations and some interesting companies to talk to. One hot topic of conversation was the collapse of Beaufort which was forced into administration (see two previous blog posts on the topic for details). There are apparently many people affected by it. There are a number of major issues that have arisen here:

  • The administrators (PWC) have suggested it might cost as much as £100 million to wind up the company and return assets to clients which seems an enormously large figure when the assets held are worth about £550 million. The costs will be taken out of the clients’ funds and as a result there will hundreds of larger clients who will suffer substantial loses (those with assets of less than £50,000 may be able to claim against the Financial Services Compensation Scheme – FSCS – but larger investors will take a hair-cut).
  • The assets (mainly shares) were apparently held in nominee accounts. Surely these were “segregated” accounts, i.e. not available to be treated as assets of the failed business? Most brokers who use nominee accounts will have wording in their contracts with their clients that cover this with often fine words that conceal the underlying reality that if there is any “shortfall” then the clients may be liable. But regardless, PWC are saying that because this is a “Special Administration” they have the right to take their fees out of the client assets/funds.
  • There will be a Creditors’ Meeting as required by all administrations but will the creditors be able to challenge the arrangements put in place by PWC and the costs being incurred? From past experience of such events I think they may find it very difficult. Administrators are a law unto themselves. It is alleged that there were offers from other brokers to take over the assets of Beaufort and their clients very quickly and at much lower cost, but that offer has been ignored. Investors need to ask why.
  • Note that the Special Administration regime was introduced during the financial crisis to enable the quick resolution of problems in financial institutions such as banks. This is where it is necessary to take prompt action to enable a company to continue trading and the clients not to be prejudiced. But in this case it seems we are back to the previous state where client assets are frozen for a lengthy period of time while the administrator runs up large bills at the clients expense.
  • I said only recently that the insolvency regime needs reform after the almost instant collapse of both Conviviality and Carillion. There may not have been a major shortfall in Beaufort and it might have been able to continue trading. But the current Administration rules just provide large, and typically unchallengeable, fees for the administrators who give the impression of having little interest in minimising costs. The result is the prejudice of investors in the case of a broker’s collapse, or of shareholders in the collapse of public companies.
  • Can I remind readers that part of the problem is the widespread use of nominee accounts by stockbrokers. I, ShareSoc and UKSA have long campaigned for reforms to reduce their use and give shareholders clear title and ownership after they purchase shares. In the meantime there are two things you can do: a) Avoid using nominee accounts if at all possible (i.e. use certificated trading or personal crest accounts so your name is on the share register); b) if you have to use a nominee account, make sure you are clear on the financial stability of the broker and that you trust the management. It would not have taken a genius to realise that some of the trading practices of Beaufort might raise some doubts about their stability and reputation.

I do suggest that investors who are affected by the collapse of Beaufort get together and develop a united front to resolve not just the problems raised by this particular case, but the wider legal issues. Forceful political representation is surely required.

See this web site for more information from PWC: https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/beaufort/beaufort-faqs.html

An amusing encounter at the Mello event was with Richard Parris, the former “Executive Chairman” of AIM listed Intercede (IGP). He was talking in a session entitled “The importance of the right board of directors” and he conceded that “separation of roles” is important, i.e. presumably he would do it differently given the chance. Richard, the founder of the company, has recently stepped down to a non-executive role, they have a new Chairman, and even Richard’s wife who was operations manager has departed. While I was in the session, there was even an RNS announcement saying the “Chief Sales Officer” had resigned (I am still monitoring the company despite having sold all but a nominal holding years back).

Richard pointed out to me that the pressure put on the company over his LTIP package back in 2012 meant that his share options are worthless as the performance targets put in place were not achieved. Well at least he is still talking to me and has joined ShareSoc as a Member apparently. Sometimes time can heal past disputes, and as I said, shareholder activism does work!

But it is regrettable that RBS are recommending voting against a resolution proposing a shareholder committee at their upcoming AGM. Perhaps not surprising, but a shareholder committee could avoid confrontation over such issues as remuneration and would be a better solution that confrontation.

I hope the Mello event becomes a regular feature of the investment calendar.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Persimmon Remuneration – Institutions Duck Responsibility

Most folks are aware of the absolutely outrageous pay levels at Persimmon Plc (PSN) and the perverse LTIP scheme that permitted them. Today was the day of their Annual General Meeting when shareholders had the opportunity to express their displeasure. Some did but a lot of investors (no doubt institutional ones) did not. The results of the vote on the Remuneration Report were:

VOTES FOR: 74.5 million, AGAINST: 70.2 million, ABSTAINED: 64.8 million.

Because of the very large number of abstentions (votes withheld), the resolution was passed by 51.5% to 48.5% of votes cast.

Is this not a sorry reflection on the corporate governance standards in the UK when such a blatantly perverse remuneration scheme is not censored by a vote against? The excuse that last year’s pay was simply a reflection of a previously approved remuneration policy is a very poor one. When the outcome was so appalling, it should have been consigned to the garbage heap by a vote against.

This is the kind of behaviour by UK company directors and institutional investors that might well lead to a socialist Government in due course who will have a mandate to deal with this problem in a more vigorous manner than the current Government.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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The Departure of Sir Martin Sorrell

At last the highest paid and longest serving FTSE-100 CEO has departed from WPP after 33 years. His total pay last year was £48 million, down from the previous year’s “single figure” of £70 million. Sir Martin was certainly perceived to be a “star” businessman, and the financial performance of WPP pleased shareholders for many years. Despite recent problems the Annual Report of the company claims a Total Shareholder Return of 1,006% over the last twenty years as against a measly 241% for the FTSE-100.

Will the company find a suitable replacement manager who can continue to grow the business? Will the company survive in its current form or be broken up? Those are the questions all the media are pontificating upon.

My thoughts on this subject were crystalized by reading the business management classic “Good to Great” on a recent holiday break. First published in 2001, the author Jim Collins reported on research he had undertaken to determine what separated out simply “good” companies from the “great” ones, i.e. those that really offered investors superior returns rather than average ones. He also looked at what turned good companies into great ones, i.e. the crystalizing factors or turning points. It’s well worth reading by investors for that reason alone, even if some of the companies reported on as “great” have subsequently gone bust (e.g. Circuit City), and amusingly Berkshire Hathaway was only rated as “good” at the time so was not included in the analysis.

Management and the quality of the leadership was one of the key factors identified. It seemed that humble, self-effacing leaders were best. They often attributed the company’s success to luck or the other senior management team members. Star managers with high profiles such as Jack Welch at GEC or Lee Iacocca at Chrysler frequently proved to be shooting stars whose achievements rapidly disappeared after they left. In other words, they did not build great companies where their legacy lived on after their departure.

This is one very applicable quote from the book when you are considering director pay in companies: “We found no systematic pattern linking executive compensation to the process of going from good to great. The evidence simply does not support the idea that the specific structure of executive compensation acts as the key lever in taking a company from good to great”. In other words, high pay does not generate exceptional performance in managers, and schemes such as LTIPs which allegedly align managers’ interests with shareholders do not help either.

It’s a book well worth reading for tips on how to identify the companies and their CEOs that are likely to generate great returns for investors.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Lack of Transparency at the FRC

The Financial Times ran an interesting article on Friday (13/4/2018) headlined “FRC criticised over transparency”. It reported that the Financial Reporting Council answered only 6 out of 52 Freedom of Information requests since 2013. Atul Shah, Professor of Accounting at the University of Suffolk, was reported as saying: “This shows that there is a real problem within the soul of the FRC. It is a public regulator and not a private members’ club, and it has clear duties of transparency, accountability and reliability which it has been avoiding over many years”. He went on to say they have been fobbing of public queries over a long period and that it was really shocking.

How can they reject so many requests? Because only certain parts of their operations are covered by the Freedom of Information Act and they can claim they cannot comment on on-going investigations.

The Local Authority Pension Funds Forum (LAPFF) sent a long submission to the public consultation on the Corporate Governance Code echoing many of those complaints and adding others and saying that the FRC suffers from “internal cultural problems”. They are clearly very unhappy with the activities of the FRC. The FRC has seen fit to respond with a 5-page rebuttal letter which they have published on their web site.

I have of course covered this issue of the culture and processes of the FRC in two previous blog posts which are here: https://roliscon.blog/2017/12/10/brexit-hbos-globo-and-the-frc/ and here: https://roliscon.blog/2017/11/22/standard-life-uk-smaller-companies-and-frc-meetings/

My view is that although the FRC is under-resourced, the approach that it takes should be reformed. Too many times major accounting and audit issues take years to investigate, and often simply result in no action. For smaller companies, complaints can disappear into a black hole with no response being received at all to complaints. Reform is required.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Low Margin Companies, and McColl’s AGM

Should you invest in companies with low profit margins? Phil Oakley of Sharescope wrote a very interesting article a few days ago which questioned whether they are likely to be good investments. This was one complaint about Conviviality which recently went into administration.

As Phil said, high margins suggest that a company has pricing power and limited competition while low profit margins make a company vulnerable to tough trading conditions or a weak economy. The reason for this is simple. If the overhead costs are relatively fixed but revenues fall even by a small amount, or costs rise, then profits can rapidly disappear. In addition if margins are already tight, then when competitors cut prices to retain volume, a company with low margins can find they simply cannot respond without incurring losses. Low profit margins are often linked to low returns on capital which is always something to avoid.

In essence, companies with low profits margins can be living on a knife edge and hence one needs to be careful about investing in them. A margin of 10% or higher is preferable, and a number of companies I am investing in have operating margins of over 50%. But what about retailers? Their operating margins are often very low. For example, Sainsbury’s is at 1.66% according to Stockopedia, Tesco is at 3.2%, ASOS is at 3.79%, Boohoo at 8.43% and Dunelm at 9.43%. The more specialist the retailer, or the higher the value items of sold, the greater the operating margin should typically be.

Carpetright which has just announced a major restructuring and refinancing was at minus 0.15% a year ago so their recent problems are perhaps no surprise. Likewise Conviviality was at 1.62% although they had both wholesale and retail operations. But ignoring all retailers because they report low profit margins is not a strategy I would follow.

McColl’s Retail Group whose AGM I attended yesterday are a convenience store operator. Their average “basket” size is only £5.62. Their operating margin is only 2.1%. Well at least it’s better than Sainsbury’s and I suspect it’s been low for many years – indeed when I first purchased the shares 2 years ago it was only 2.5%. But if you look at the more conventional valuation metrics it does not look so bad. Prospective p/e of 11.9, dividend yield of 4.7% and like many retailers it generates a lot of cash as it sells its merchandise before it has to pay its suppliers – at least that’s true until they go bust.

They are therefore companies that you need to keep a close eye on to see that margins are not falling, and that revenue on a like-for-like basis is not declining. That’s particularly so when we have a bad patch of weather affecting footfall as we had recently, or where they are vulnerable to erosion from internet retailers. Are McColl’s in that regard? Probably not because 60% of their customers live within 400 meters of their local shop and they provide both fresh/chilled food and services such as a post office. The company is looking to “engage” even more with their customers who typically visit very frequently.

It was a useful AGM with a number of good questions from the audience (less than 10 shareholders attending at the company’s head office in Essex). One question related to the success of the acquisition of 290 stores from the Co-Op which have now been fully integrated but the CEO rejected a suggestion the stores were below targets and said the deal “met the business case”.

However one problem the company has faced in the last year is the collapse of supplier Palmer and Harvey. The business was closed by the administrator almost immediately so McColl’s had to make alternative arrangements very rapidly. This resulted in analysts forecasts of profits being reduced from £54m to £50m according to the CFO. In future they will be reliant to a large extent on Morrisons who they have done a deal with to retail products under the Safeway name. It seems to me that these two companies might become so closely linked that sooner or later it might make sense for Morrisons to acquire the business. Morrisons sold off their own convenience store chain in 2015 which was losing money and not easy to scale up.

One shareholder complained about the remuneration arrangements – a typical complex scheme including LTIPs. He said “why do people need a bonus to do their job?”. The Chairman said there is competition for talent. I also discussed this with the CFO after the formal meeting closed and suggested there were better solutions to incentivise staff.

I also talked to the Company Secretary about the problems with voting via Link Asset Services (see previous blog post on that topic).

One unusual aspect of this AGM was the issuance of the Minutes of the last AGM and request for shareholders to approve. Companies normally do minute their AGMs but don’t publish them.

The votes were taken on a poll with the results only announced later in the day. About 13% of votes were against the Remuneration Policy, against the Chairman and Rem. Comm. Chair Georgina Harvey and over 18% against share allotment and pre-emption resolutions. Plus 13% against company share purchases and the change of notice of General Meetings. These are unusually high figures and the board has committed to look into the reasons why and report back. Note that Klarus Capital hold over 11% of the company having bought the stake held by former Chairman James Lancaster.

My conclusions about this company: The management seem to be making the right decisions but they do need to improve the profit margin and return on capital. However it seems one reason for the deal with Morrison’s was to obtain “improved commercial terms” so that suggests they recognize this. Moving into growing segments such as “food-on-the go” and out of declining ones such as newspapers and tobacco should help as will store refurbishments and the addition of a few more stores.

The share price of McColls has been picking up recently from a low point. But like a lot of my holdings it seems to be somewhat volatile of late. Is that as a result of the holiday period with lower trading volumes, a tax year end effect, or investors being nervous about war in Syria? Will it be war or no war? Investors never like binary bets. Perhaps Donald Trump should get on the hot-line to Russia and negotiate an alternative scenario. After all he has written a book called “The Art of the Deal” so he should know how to finesse a face saving way out of the problem.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Conviviality Fire Sale

Conviviality (CVR) has now gone into administration, and the ordinary shares are probably worthless (they were suspended some days ago and are likely to remain so). The administrators have already sold the major parts of the business in “pre-pack” administration deals. That’s where arrangements are made to dispose of assets in advance of the appointment of administrators by the prospective administrators before they have in fact been appointed. Is that legal you may ask? Yes it is because of a past legal case however perverse the result might be.

It’s interesting to look at the deals done by the Conviviality administrators:

  1. Retail chains Bargain Booze and Wine Rack have been sold to Bestway for £7 million.
  2. The wholesale division comprising the former businesses of Mathew Clark and Bibendum has been sold to C&C (owners of Magners Cider) for £1, although it seems the new owners have taken on some of the debts owed.

Matthew Clark was bought by C&C for £200 million three years ago and Bibendum was bought for £60 million in 2016. You can see why I call this a “fire sale” when the administrator seems to have lined up buyers in just a few days and disposed of these businesses at a value that seems to be a great bargain for the buyers.

One of the problems with administrations is that often the administrators have an objective to sell the business absolutely as soon as possible. This is to protect their own financial interests it frequently appears to me as much as it is to protect the jobs of employees and maintain a business as a “going concern”. Administrators can only get paid out of the cash that is present in the business or can be collected. That’s why nobody wanted to take on the administration of Carillion and it went straight into liquidation.

Administrators have an obligation to market a business for sale but can that be done adequately and the best price obtained when the deal has clearly been done in just a few days? That obviously does not allow any time for the normal due diligence on a substantial deal so the buyers won’t have paid anywhere near the normal market price for the assets.

In summary, the buyers of the assets get a great deal, the jobs get preserved (at least to some extent), the bankers to the company often get their loans back and the administrators get well paid while minimising their risks. But the previous owners of the business (the ordinary shareholders) get left with nothing. Is that equitable?

In effect the current legal structure, and particularly the pre-pack arrangements, enable the rapid dismantling of a business when it might have been recoverable if the company had been able to have more time to refinance the business and stave off its creditors for just a few weeks.

This is why I argue that the current UK insolvency regime needs reform. It destroys companies in short order when ordinary shareholders have often invested in the company to grow the business in the past. In the case of Conviviality it only listed on AIM in 2013 and did subsequent placings to finance its expansion.

The reason for the invention of “administration” in the insolvency regime was to enable a more measured wind-up, disposal or restructuring of a business rather than a liquidation. But insolvency practitioners (i.e. administrators) seem to have changed it into a short-cut to wind-up. Reform is surely needed.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Moneysupermarket and Private Eye

Fame at last. This week Private Eye published a letter of mine on the subject of Moneysupermarket.com Plc. This was in response to a somewhat inaccurate article on companies ditching their advertising agents. This is what the letter said:

“Sir, Contrary to your article on companies ditching their advertising agencies in EYE 1466, where it is stated that Moneysupermarket.com lost money last year, the truth is that they actually made profits of £78.1 million.

However, as an investor in the company, I applaud the action of the new CEO in firing their advertising agency. I always thought good advertising was about promoting the merits of the product or service you were offering. But Moneysupermarket’s recent campaigns, such as a prancing “twerking businessman with a giant arse” as you put it, was nothing of the kind. Perhaps the new(ish) CEO (he has been there a year) took a similar view. Particularly when the financial results for last year were indeed disappointing, albeit revenues and profits were up 4% – but that’s not much more than inflation.”

Private Eye often publish some revealing articles on financial matters and this latest edition contains one such by “Slicker”. It covers the “existential crisis in corporate governance” which he says has increased since the financial crisis of 2008 with no top bankers, auditors, lawyers or regulators in court. The article covers many of the scandals that have come to light in that period, and this is a particularly pertinent comment therein: “Non-executive directors, who supposedly oversee the executive directors, have too often become an over-rewarded mafia of mediocrity, exhibiting all the signs of Stockholm Syndrome, their captors being the domineering CEOs to whim they never say no”.

He suggests some remedies which include “a corporate vicarious liability law” as in the USA, a Sarbanes-Oxley style law, and the banning of LTIPs. All well argued and it’s certainly worth reading.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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More Annoyance from Link Asset Services

I have complained before about the services from the registrar Link Asset Services that frustrate shareholders from voting – see https://roliscon.blog/2018/03/14/voting-shares-via-link-asset-services-its-infuriating/

The latest example is on another company where Link sent a paper copy of the Annual Report out, and a Notice of the AGM, but no paper proxy voting form. They suggest in a covering letter that I can either vote on-line using their “share portal” or request a paper proxy form.

For those of us who do not wish to sign up for their share portal, and just want to vote our shares (which are on the register), this is exceedingly frustrating. It’s just another way that shareholders are being discouraged from voting, and the exercise of their rights made more difficult.

I have written to the Company Secretary suggesting they fire Link Asset Services and switch to using another registrar who can provide a better service. Unless Link have a change of mind on this issue.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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GKN and Melrose – The Reality

Melrose has won the battle to take control of GKN although the Government might yet step in to halt the takeover. On what grounds is not exactly clear. Never having held shares in either company, I thought it worth looking at the facts rather than the hyperbole surrounding this deal as there seemed to be some myths being propagated.

Is GKN a key business in the UK’s engineering and technology infrastructure based on a long history of innovation? Or is it a financially poorly performing conglomerate that was vulnerable to a bid?

It has been said that GKN produced Spitfires in the Second World War but in reality they did not develop the plane but were just one of several assembly plants that were subcontracted to produce it in volume, In the 1960s I well remember the company under the name Guest, Keen and Nettlefold and in Birmingham they had large factories producing nuts and bolts. Hardly high-tech engineering even at that time. Later they did make a success of car parts production particularly with constant velocity joints (CVJs) as used in the Mini and other front wheel drive vehicles. But they are now proposing to split off the driveline business and merge it with another company. They plan to focus on the aerospace business. You can see a “polished” version of the history of the company here: https://www.gkn.com/en/about-gkn/history/ . In reality a long history of dubious diversifications, followed by later rationalisations.

The recent financial performance has been disappointing. Reported earnings per share in 2017 were the same as five years previously with a trough in between. Dividends in that period grew slowly and at the current share price equate to about 2% yield. Return on assets a measly 5.6% last year, and even that was an improvement on previous years. Although the financial prospects based on analysts’ forecasts might be slightly improving, is it not simply a case that institutional investors might have become disillusioned with the management in recent years and seen an opportunity in the Melrose bid to improve the financial returns?

There will no doubt have been some activity by share traders, arbitrageurs and hedge funds of late who might have influenced the outcome. But that’s capitalism in action. Holders, even long-term ones, sell to higher bidders.

Personally I oppose any suggestion that short-term holders should not be allowed to vote, and the use of other “poison-pill” mechanisms that can defeat takeovers. If I purchased a share in a company last week, I want to be able to vote it! I may not have known that a bid was coming and how I vote will depend on the arguments put by both sides. Clearly in this case GKN simply lost the argument.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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All Change at Intercede, and Drug Development Costs

An interesting announcement this morning was the news that founder Richard Parris is losing his role as Executive Chairman at Intercede Group (IGP). He is stepping down to the role of Non-Executive Director and they are looking for a new CEO.

The company operates in the digital identity area. I once held quite a few shares in it but became disillusioned with the leadership some years ago and the company’s remuneration arrangements, so I now only have a nominal holding. For a company with interesting technology in a hot sector, it has a disappointing financial track record. Slow growth and lumpy sales, and consistent losses in recent years.

It is surely good news that Mr Parris is stepping down, although the share price has fallen today at the time of writing. He and his wife do hold quite a significant proportion of the shares. Let us hope the new management is able to make this company a world beater after all – it seems to have suffered the problem of many UK technology companies in failing to develop a sales and marketing strategy to turn good technology into market leadership.

I spent an interesting day on Wednesday meeting with Professor Jonathan Barratt at Leicester University. He is researching IgA Nephropathy, a disease that can lead to kidney damage and ultimately the need for a kidney transplant (as in my case). It included a tour of the labs and attending a lecture he gave on the subject which was most interesting. It’s a worthy cause if any investors have surplus cash after the recent stock market rout as Prof. Barratt and his team are making significant progress. Remember there are tax benefits from charitable donations.

One of the things Prof. Barratt mentioned was the enormous cost of drug development. According to the Tufts Centre, they suggested the cost was $2.6 billion in 2016 to get a drug to the FDA approved stage. One can see why relatively rare diseases do not get a lot of interest from drug companies, particularly those like IgA Nephropathy where the progression of the disease can be so slow that clinical trials take years to complete. I also now know exactly why I don’t invest in drug development companies, where the chance of success and obtaining a good financial return is so low.

But one aspect that Prof Barratt is working on is the possibility of improved diagnosis by using blood tests based on antibodies to identify the disease at an early stage which might assist with prevention. This is an area where I am invested though with holdings in Abcam (ABC) and Bioventix (BVCP). The latter produced some unexpectedly good interim results due to one of their customers identifying some royalties due that had not previously been reported. But even without that the figures were good.

One important future revenue stream for Bioventix is a troponin test which is a marker for heart attacks. This might speed up the diagnosis of chest pain. That is important if you arrive in A&E with severe chest pain as there can be many other causes although doctors often focus on that to the exclusion of problems such as gall stones or gall bladder infections which I was once told were more common. Delayed or misdiagnosis is obviously a major issue here that the new test might prevent.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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