Another Accounting Scandal – Goals Soccer Centres

Yet another problem in accounting has been revealed at Goals Soccer Centres (GOAL). This morning they disclosed in a trading update the discovery of “certain accounting errors” and are reviewing their accounting practices. As a result, the board now expects full year results to be below expectations and publication of the 2018 results has been delayed.

The even worse news is that they have breached their banking covenants so are having to have one of those difficult conversations with their bankers. The share price has fallen 30% this morning (at the time of writing).

Goals is an operator of soccer pitches which listed on AIM as long ago as 2004. Revenue has been flat for the last few years and profits variable. Net debt approximates to revenue which is never a good sign. The company changed auditors from KPMG to BDO in June 2018 and in July 2018 the CFO resigned from the board “with immediate effect” to join his family business but continued in his role as CFO. A new “interim” CFO was not appointed until the 15th January 2019.

After this “own goal”, the company suggests it “will take a more prudent approach” in future. But it reinforces the need to reform the accounting and auditing professions because we are very likely to be told that this issue extends back for more than one year.

Note: I have never held shares in this company despite the fact there was some enthusiasm for it among investors at one time. The share price peaked at 425p in late 2007 but it’s been steadily downhill since. It’s now 38p. I was always doubtful whether there was any real money to be made enabling amateurs to play soccer.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Gooch & Housego and Sectors to Avoid

Today Gooch & Housego (GHH), a photonic components manufacturer, held its Annual General Meeting in Ilminster, Somerset. I would have attended as a shareholder except the time of 11.00 am would have meant a very early start. As it was, the trading update issued in the morning prompted me to sell my holding anyway.

The key negative in the announcement was this: “Looking forward, we believe timing and mix will result in a FY 2019 group trading performance showing low single digit growth compared to last year”. That compares to analyst’s prior forecasts of revenue growth of 14% and adjusted earnings growth of 48%. The share price promptly fell by 20% to about 1100p in the morning and it had already been falling in the last few weeks from a peak of over 1800p in October 2018.

Apart from the well-known problems in China of the manufacturing sector, the cause of the problem is assigned in the announcement to the cyclical nature of the microelectronics sector and the recent impact of the US/China tariff wars. It also comments on the “excess inventory” in the Chinese market taking longer than expected to normalise. However, the company does expect a “multi-year growth phase” in the hi-reliability fibre couplers market which may become apparent in the second half of the year.

But my experience tells me that electronic component manufacturers are notoriously vulnerable to wide swings in volumes and profits. If they are not selling in cyclical markets, or are vulnerable to stock holding changes, they are vulnerable to rapid product obsolescence and leapfrogging by competitors. This is normally a sector I avoid for those reasons. GHH seemed to be operating in a very specialised part of the market which I thought might make them less prone to these problems, but it seems not.

This is a case where my prejudices against a certain market sector are reinforced. Such companies need to be very cheap but Gooch & Housego has not been recently, being perceived as a high-growth tech stock with big ambitions.

The other concern is that the share price decline from October last year was not based on any published news from the company, although the fact that the CFO was declared as leaving in November might have been perceived as such. But in October 2018 the company said: “Overall G&H has a robust order book combined with greater diversification. The Board remains confident that the Group is well positioned to continue to deliver further progress in FY2019 and beyond”.

It would seem that some folks knew about possible problems at the company before me which always makes for tricky investment. With a relatively small shareholding which I had only held for a short time, it’s an example of when it’s best to sell and take a loss. The business might recover but such an experience tells me that it’s always likely to be vulnerable to such shocks.

The electronic hardware sector will therefore continue to be on my blacklist of sectors to avoid which includes oil/gas exploration and production companies, mining exploration, banks and other financial sector companies, insurers, gaming companies, fashion retailers, drug developers, etc, etc. You might call me opinionated but experience tells me that some sectors are just too tricky to invest in unless you have very specialised knowledge. I’ll probably be giving my reasons in detail for avoiding some sectors in a book I am working on as it will take longer to explain than can be covered in a short blog article.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Accesso and Executive Chairmen

Yesterday the share price of Accesso Technology Group (ASCO) dropped over 35% after the company issued a trading update and also announced that Executive Chairman Tom Burnet was moving to become a non-executive director. This company has been one of the great growth stories on AIM after Tom took charge as CEO in 2010. Revenue has grown more than 6 times since then but profits and cash flow have been more variable. But Tom is a very persuasive speaker and the share price multiplied by more than 25 times to reach a peak of 2800p in September 2018 – it’s now 930p.

I first purchased the shares in 2012 when the business was selling a solution for theme park queuing and most of their revenue came from one customer. They have now developed the technology to have wider applications and have a wider customers base of “visitor attractions”. Acquisitions have also been made to broaden the product offering and the strategic plan of the business was to become a “consolidator” in the ticketing and other IT solutions to this sector.

Tom Burnet was made Executive Chairman in May 2016. That concerned me somewhat because he is clearly a very forceful person and I generally do not like Executive Chairmen unless there is a very good reason to have that kind of sole dictatorship such as the company being in dire difficulties – there did not seem to be such a justification here, and it is of course contrary to Corporate Governance guidelines for good reasons.

I sold most of my shares over 2016, 2017 and 2018 after the share price continued to ramp up driven by momentum and some investors apparently feeling that Tom could do no wrong. He seemed to think likewise when I prefer more humble personalities as CEOs. Institutional investors also piled in. But the financial numbers were not all that impressive – indeed I queried the poor return on capital and large increase in administrative expenses at last year’s AGM. Other commentators queried the revenue recognition, poor cash flow and high levels of software development capitalisation. Director share sales by Tom and others in 2018 were also a negative.

That’s the history, so what about the current valuation? The last published financial results were the interims for the 6 months to end June 2018 when I made a note that the prospective normalised p/e was 47! But Accesso’s interim results are usually very untypical of the full year figures as it’s a very seasonal business – not many people visit theme parks in the winter. But they did mention the impact of IFRS15 on revenue recognition where they had previously been recognizing the full value of tickets, not just their commission income. This is probably why current analysts’ forecasts show a fall in revenue for the 2018 year versus 2017, with a resumption of growth thereafter.

The latest announcement suggested the full year results will be “broadly” in line with market expectations – which is a bit tendentious bearing in mind we are now well past the financial year end already. It also mentions a one-off cost exceptional cost of $1.7 million on an acquisition which was aborted in October 2018. Why was there no announcement of this at the time as surely it was price-sensitive information?

Actually figuring out what the likely earnings will be for 2018, particularly as the new board might wish to take a bath and clean out any questionable capitalisations is almost impossible without more information.

My fall-back valuation method in such circumstances is to look at the market cap revenue multiple. Revenue forecast for 2019 is $138m which equates to £106m when the current market capitalisation is £254m. So the multiple is 2.4 which is relatively low for a high growth business, with good IP (protected by patents), high recurring revenue figures from existing customers and some profits rather than losses. The business might look very attractive to trade buyers who could strip out a lot of the overhead costs (which is why revenue multiples are important in valuing such companies).

There may be more bad news to come of course, but at least they now have a conventional board structure with a new non-executive Chairman (Bill Russell) who seems to have a very relevant background.

The dangers or having a dominant and forceful Executive Chairman have of course been reinforced by events at Patisserie (CAKE) where Luke Johnson had that role. Having a more conventional board structure might not have prevented the fraud there altogether, but it might have enabled the non-executive directors to more easily question the way the company operated, the internal controls and the information being provided to them. Indeed it might have ensured more questioning non-executive directors were appointed to the board in the first place. A separate Chairman might also have questioned whether Luke Johnson was spreading himself too thinly across his numerous business interests.

The corporate governance principle of having a non-executive Chairman is not something investors should ignore.

Postscript: I corrected the revenue growth figure and the market cap sales multiple figure a few hours after the above was first published after I identified some sloppy research, but the conclusions were unchanged.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

 

AssetCo, Patisserie, Stockpiling, Warehouses, Sheds, Brexit and Venezuala

A week ago, an award of damages of £21 million plus interest and costs was made against Grant Thornton for their breach of duty when acting as auditors of AssetCo Plc (ASTO) in 2009/10. See https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2019/150.html for the full judgement. I understand Grant Thornton may appeal. These are the key sentences in the judgement: “It is common ground that in those years the senior management team at AssetCo behaved in a way that was fundamentally dishonest. During the audit process management made dishonest statements to GT, provided GT with fabricated and massaged evidence and dishonestly misstated reported profits, and provided GT with flawed and dishonest forecasts and cash flow projections. Outside of the audit process, management were engaged in dishonestly ‘overfunding’ assets (i.e. misleading banks as to the costs of new purchases etc so as to borrow more than was permitted), misappropriating monies, dishonestly under-reporting tax liabilities to HMRC, concluding fraudulent related party transactions and forging and backdating documents. GT accepts that it was negligent in a number of respects as the company’s auditor in failing to detect these matters…”

In 2012, AssetCo (ASTO) was forced to make prior period adjustments for 2010 that wiped more than £235m off its balance sheet. AssetCo was, and still is, an AIM listed company now operating in the fire and emergency services sector.

This is undoubtedly a similar case to Patisserie (CAKE). According to a report by Investors Champion, former Chairman Luke Johnson suggests it “has possible relevance for a claim against Grant Thornton” and he will be pushing the administrators to instigate similar action. Let us hope it does not take as long at ten years and millions of pounds in legal costs which administrators may be reluctant to stand.

According to a report in the FT, manufacturers are stockpiling goods at a record rate in anticipation of supply chain disruption from Brexit. Importers are also stockpiling goods – for example Unilever is storing ice-creams and deodorant such as its Magnum ice-cream bars which are made in Germany and Italy. There is also the increasing demand for warehousing by internet retailers, even for smaller “sheds” to enable them to provide next day or even same day delivery.

Big warehouses are one of the few commercial property sectors that has shown a good return of late and I am already stacked up with two of the leaders in that sector – Segro (SCRO) and Tritax Big Box (BBOX). On the 31st January the Daily Telegraph tipped smaller company Urban Logistics REIT (SHED) for similar reasons and the share price promptly jumped by 7% the next day wiping out the discount to NAV.

There has been much misinformation spread about Nissan’s decision to cancel manufacture of a new car model in the UK. They denied it was anything to do with Brexit. This was to be a diesel-powered model and as they pointed out, sales of diesel vehicles are rapidly declining in the UK. The same problem has also hit JLR (Jaguar-LandRover). One aspect not taken into account in many media stories was that Japan has just concluded a free trade deal with the EU. Japanese car manufacturers no long need to build cars in Europe to avoid punitive tariffs. Where will the new vehicle now be made? Japan of course!

There has been lots of media coverage of the politics of Venezuela and its rampant inflation. A good example of how damaging extreme socialism can be to an economy. Over twenty-five years ago it had a sound economy and I had a business trip scheduled to visit our local distributor there. But at the last minute the trip was cancelled after a number of people were killed in riots over bus fares. I never did make it and I doubt I will ever get there now.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Cloudcall Placing, Patisserie News, Brexit and Momentum Investing

I reported a week ago on a “Capital Markets Day” at Cloudcall (CALL) – see https://roliscon.blog/2019/01/18/cloudcall-investor-meeting-sophos-rpi-and-brexit/ . There was much discussion on whether the company should raise more finance, via debt or equity. I suggested they needed more equity. This morning they announced a placing of 2.4 million shares at 100p to raise (the share price last night was 109p. It represents about 10% dilution for other shareholders. The placing was completed in minutes so they had clearly lined up existing investors in advance. The cash will be invested (i.e. spent) on sales and marketing.

But they are also refinancing and extending their debt facility. Let us hope they don’t have to use it.

More bad news from Patisserie (CAKE). A report in the Guardian, based on sight of the information sent to bidders by the administrator, suggests that the accounts were false as far back as 2014. That’s when the IPO on AIM took place. In addition, sales in established stores had fallen by 4% in the last two years and the remaining 122 stores were on course to make a £2 million loss in the year to September 2019.

The Guardian report mentioned a number of possible bidders for some of the outlets, but generally few of them. So the chance of a major realisation for the benefit of creditors in such a “fire sale” process seems unlikely.

Brexit. After last night’s votes in the Commons, the battle lines between Theresa May and the EU look to be drawn up. She is getting near a clear mandate from Parliament which will help in the battle with EU bureaucrats and politicians who are adamant they won’t renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement. But they will have to if they don’t want the UK to exit without one, which would threaten a lot of EU country exports. Come March 28th, it will be time for a face-saving compromise – no change to the Withdrawal Agreement – just the addition of a codicil providing alternatives to the Backstop.

Momentum Investing. Are investors falling out of love with Momentum Investing? Momentum investing has been one of the most attractive investing strategies in the last few years. If a share price was going up, you just bought more, regardless of fundamentals. There were many academic studies showing that it was a very effective strategy. In ten years of rising shares prices, it was relatively foolproof. But when share prices are going down, as in the last part of 2018, it does of course work in reverse. You have to sell shares as the prices drop.

Just reviewing a few model portfolios run by investment magazines and on-line portals suggests to me that momentum investing is no longer working as the 5 year and longer returns generated are worse than the market as a whole. The moral is that there are no simple solutions to achieving superior investment returns. Once everyone is aware of a successful strategy, its benefits disappear as they are traded away.

It looks like we will have to revert to the hard work of doing financial and business analysis of companies rather than simply following shooting stars.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Patisserie – and How to Avoid Disasters

The events at Patisserie (CAKE) have been well covered in both the national media and financial press so I won’t repeat them here. This article will therefore concentrate on how to avoid such companies in the future. The case of Patisserie is very similar to those of Globo in 2015 and Torex Retail in 2007. All three were large AIM companies that went into administration after fraud was discovered. These were not just cases of over-optimistic or misleading financial accounts, but deliberate false accounting. Executives of Torex Retail received jail terms and Globo is still being investigated. Note that such criminal cases take years to come to a conclusion. Both Globo and Patisserie were audited by the same firm (Grant Thornton). Such cases can happen not just in relatively small AIM companies, but also large ones – for example Polly Peck.

Ordinary shareholders received zero from the administration of Torex Retail and Globo and it is very likely it will be the same from Patisserie. The only glimmer of light is that it does look as though a normal sale process is being followed by the administrators and there is at least one enthusiastic bidder for the remaining stores. There is also the prospect of a tax refund from HMRC because it is clear the fraud has been running for some years so Patisserie has been paying tax on imaginary profits. But the bank overdrafts/loans need paying, loans from Luke Johnson need repaying (which incredibly seem to rank ahead of the banks), trade creditors need paying, staff need paying, HMRC needs paying and the administrators will run up the usual enormous bills no doubt so I doubt there will be much, if anything, left after those distributions. There usually is not.

Legal action against the former directors who were culpable in these events by regulatory authorities is highly likely. For example, it is a crime (market abuse) to publish false accounts under the Financial Services and Markets Act so that would be one basis. Investors who invested in the company on the basis of those false accounts should submit a complaint to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and encourage them to take such action.

Are there possible legal actions by investors to recover their losses? Perhaps and I know at least two people who are talking to solicitors about that. But such legal actions are very expensive and depend on a) Identifying defendants with sufficient assets to meet both the claim and legal costs; b) Having sufficient standing to do so. Unfortunately shareholders would probably have to do it via a “derivative action” which means applying to the court to force the administrator to pursue such a claim. Bearing in mind administrations are often relatively short term, and it will take years to conclude regulatory investigations and actions, there might be a problem there.

Who could be targeted? The auditors possibly although they will probably say they were misled by the company directors (bank accounts not disclosed, etc). Luke Johnson perhaps although he clearly denies previous knowledge of the fraud and pursuing him for breach of his responsibilities as a director might be difficult – however he does have the assets having taken well over £20 million out of the company in share sales over the years. Former finance director Chris Marsh sold shares worth £8.42 million in 2018 while former CEO Paul May sold shares worth £14.34 million in that year it is worth noting. They both appear to have been near the centre of the fraud but culpability clearly will need to be proved. They have yet to comment in public on the matter.

Were the share sales by those two executive directors a sign that all was not well at the company? Perhaps but Luke Johnson was not selling in 2018 and these sales were the result of share option exercises from LTIPs which executives often sell, partly to meet tax demands.

So how to avoid such fraudulent companies from damaging your wealth in future? From experience I can offer the following advice, and you will see why Patisserie side-stepped all the warning signs:

  1. Try to invest in directors who you feel you can trust. Luke Johnson had a very public reputation in the investment world which he was no doubt keen to protect. Indeed his actions to try and bail-out the business when the fraud was discovered shows exactly that, although institutional investors who took up the rescue rights issue will be none too happy. His fellow executive directors were a long-established team and hence should have been trustworthy. Make sure you take opportunities to meet the management.
  2. Do the financial analysis. Read the book “The Signs Were There” which I have covered in a previous article – it tells you where to look. For example, do the profits turn into cash? But if the cash on the balance sheet is a lie, as at both Patisserie and Globo, it does not help. Does the company not pay dividends when it could, or make decisions to raise more debt when it does not apparently need it or provide good justification? That was the what crystalised my views on Globo.
  3. Look at who else is investing or commenting on the company, e.g. Chris Boxall of Fundamental Asset Management, a very experienced small cap investor, or Paul Scott of Stockopedia who recently said “Quindell, Globo and Carillion were easy to spot a mile off – indeed we warned investors of all 3 long before they blew up. Patisserie Valerie however, appeared to be a wonderful, cash generative business”. Because I follow what others are saying and pay attention, I never invested in Torex Retail and I did not lose money on Globo despite holding some shares until the end. But Patisserie fooled pretty well everyone.
  4. Research the product or service offering. Some people say they were wary because when they visited the shops, they were not busy and did not like the cakes. That was not my experience after a number of visits to different locations.
  5. Read the IPO prospectus for AIM companies. It tells you a lot more than you can read in the Annual Reports and is legally required under AIM rules to be available on their web site.
  6. Invest in steps and not at the IPO so you can build confidence in the company. Private investors have the advantage of being able to do that. After all it’s unusual for frauds to run for years without being discovered by someone – rarely by auditors though. I first invested in Patisserie in 2017 and built up a small holding in stages following the share price momentum. But this was only limited protection and it appears the fraud had been going on for many years at Patisserie.
  7. Have a diversified portfolio so one company can go bust and it does not undermine your overall returns. If you invest in large cap companies which may be less risky, perhaps 10 to 20 shares are sufficient diversification. Throwing in a few investment trusts or other funds will help as they are intrinsically diversified. But if you are investing in AIM shares you need a lot more. By having a large portfolio of shares in terms of numbers of holdings the damage to my portfolio from the administration has been a loss of 0.9% of my portfolio value. That’s less than the portfolio varies from day to day on some days. I have spoken to a number of investors who bet their houses or life savings on one share, e.g. Northern Rock or the Royal Bank of Scotland rights issue. One at least went bankrupt. Don’t be so daft.
  8. Monitor news flow on a company and unusual share price movements. But at Patisserie there was really nothing unusual until the date the shares were suspended.

I hope the above comments help investors to avoid the dogs and complete frauds of the investment world. Some of these avoidance techniques help you to avoid not just outright frauds but general financial mismanagement by company directors.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Bioventix AGM, Babcock Attack and FCA Measures on CFDs

On Thursday (6/12/2018) I attended the Annual General Meeting of Bioventix Plc (BVXP) at Farnham Castle. There were about a dozen ordinary shareholders present. Bioventix develop antibodies for use in blood tests. Their Annual Report contains a very good explanation of the business.

This AIM company had revenue of £7.9 million last year and post-tax profits of £5.6 million. They did that with only 15 staff. Total director pay was £362,000 even though CEO Peter Harrison’s pay went up by 54% – but no shareholders even mentioned that. With consistent growth, good dividends and high return on capital, there’s not much to complain about here.

There is a copy of the last presentation the company gave to investors here: https://www.bioventix.com/investors/overview/ which gives you more information on the company.

I won’t cover the meeting in detail but there were a few points worth mentioning:

Peter explained that the Vitamin D antibody market is “plateauing”, i.e. unlikely to show the same growth as historically. The key product for future revenue growth is their new Troponin test for which there are high hopes, but take-off seems sluggish. This is a marker for heart attacks and is used to check when someone turns up in A&E with chest pains whether they are having a heart attack or some other problem, the former being much more serious of course and needing rapid treatment. The new Troponin test is faster and more accurate which helps speedy and more accurate diagnosis. However adoption of it to replace the older test is slow. This seems to be because hospitals are slow to change their “protocols”. There is also some competition but it is not clear how the company’s product stands against that in terms of sales. It would seem more education and promotion of the new product is required but Bioventix is reliant on the blood-testing machine partner (Siemens) to promote it and it seems there is little financial advantage in doing so to them – the new product is no more expensive than the old. That you might think makes it easy for customers to convert to the new, but also provides little motivation for the supplier to promote. However, NICE and others are promoting the new tests. That’s a summary of what Peter explained to the shareholders with my deductions.

It would certainly be of advantage to patients if the new test was adopted. Might have saved me hanging around in A&E for most of the night a few years back just awaiting confirmation I had not had a heart attack.

There are other antibodies in the R&D pipeline although it can take 5 years from R&D commencement to product sales, even if the product is adopted. All R&D is written off in the year incurred though.

There were questions on cash and special dividends which the company sometimes pays. The business is highly cash-generative but they like to keep about £5 million in cash on the balance sheet and no debt so that they can take up any acquisition or IP opportunities.

On Friday (7/12/2018), there was an interesting article in the Financial Times on the attack on Babcock International (BAB) by Boatman Capital Research – a typical type of attack by an anonymous blogger probably combined with shorting. The article quoted an investor as saying “Boatman made some valid points…..but there were whopping inaccuracies which seemed calculated to drive the share price down”. For example, the article mentioned claims about overruns on a contract to build a dry dock at Devonport – there is no such contract.

Babcock has been trying to find out who Boatman Capital are, but with no success at all. The organisation or its owners cannot be located, and their web site is anonymised. So Babcock cannot even sue the authors. They may well be located overseas in any case which would make it even more difficult. Babcock share price has been falling as a result and is down 20% since the Boatman report was published. See the FT report here: https://www.ft.com/content/c2780d6e-f942-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c

Comment (I do not hold Babcock shares): The Boatman report seems to be the usual mixture of a few probable facts, mixed with errors and innuendo as one sees in such shorting attacks. There have been a few examples where such reports did provide very important information but because of the approach the writers of such reports take it is very difficult to deduce whether the content is all true, partially true, or totally erroneous and misguided. The shorter does not care because they can do the damage regardless and turn a profit.

The basic problem is that with the internet it is easy to propagate “fake news” and get it circulated so rapidly that the company cannot respond fast enough, and regulators likewise – the latter typically take months or years to do anything, even if they have a channel they can use. We really need new legislation to stop this kind of market abuse which can just as easily involve going long on a stock as going short. Contracts for Difference (CFDs) are one way to take an interest in a share price without owning the underlying stock and hence are ideal for such market manipulations.

Which brings me on to the next topic. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has announced proposals to restrict the sales of CFDs and Binary Options to retail investors. Most retail investors in CFDs lose money – see my previous comments here on this subject: https://roliscon.blog/2018/01/14/want-to-get-rich-quickly/ . The latest FCA proposals are covered here: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-proposes-permanent-measures-retail-cfds-and-binary-options

You will note it contains protections to ensure clients cannot lose all their money and positions will be closed out earlier. But leverage can still be up to 30 to 1. The new rules might substantially reduce losses incurred by retail investors, the FCA believes.

But it still looks like a half-baked compromise to me. If the FCA really wants to protect retail investors from their own foolishness, then an outright ban would surely be wiser. At best most CFD purchasers are speculating, not investing, and I cannot see why the FCA should be permitting what is essentially gambling on stock prices. It creates a dubious culture, and the promotion of these products is based on them being a quick way to riches when in reality it’s usually a quick way to become poorer.

You only have to look at the accounts of publicly listed CFD providers to see who is making the money – it’s the providers not the clients. Those companies seem to be mainly saying the new rules won’t have much impact on them. That is shame when they should do and shows how the FCA’s solution is a poor, half-baked compromise.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.