Rio Tinto Requisitioned Resolutions – Paranoia Exemplified

Yesterday (7/2/2020), Rio Tinto (RIO) issued an announcement which said that resolutions had been requisitioned by shareholders for the Annual General Meeting in May of Rio Tinto Ltd. Note that Rio Tinto has a rather peculiar corporate structure.  Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited established a dual listed companies (DLC) structure in 1995. As a result, the two companies are managed as a single economic unit, even though both companies continue to be separate legal entities with separate share listings and share registers. We may see similar resolutions for the UK Plc company in due course as the resolutions might require a “Joint Decision”.

The first resolution is a Special one that seeks to amend the Constitution to give shareholders the right to pass ordinary resolutions that give the directors an opinion on how they should exercise their powers. But it is only an “advisory” resolution and appears to be more aimed at supporting or enabling the second resolution.

The second resolution is an Ordinary one and is worded as follows: “Shareholders request that the company, in subsequent annual reporting, disclose short, medium and long-term targets for its scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions (Targets) and performance against the Targets, consistent with the guidance of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. Targets should reflect decarbonisation pathways for the company’s products in line with the climate goals of the Paris Agreement”.

Readers might not know what Scope 3 emissions are, but as this issue recently came up at a local council meeting which I attended, I do know something about them. Scope 3 emissions are all indirect emissions that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including both upstream and downstream. That’s as opposed to Scope 1 emissions which are direct emissions from owned or controlled sources and Scope 2 emissions which are indirect emissions from the generation of purchased energy.

Reporting of Scope 3 emissions would require a company to identify all the emissions made by suppliers and customers and even include such emissions as from staff travel to work. A company will in practice have no control over most of those emissions and obtaining the required information might be very difficult.

It’s basically a pointless and expensive exercise to impose such an obligation on any organisation whether it’s a major international company such as Rio Tinto or my local council, but there are many people who would like it done.

This is surely a demonstration of the extreme paranoia that is gripping the world at present over CO2 emissions with the concern that such emissions are contributing to global warming. Even it that is the case, and that argument is far from proven beyond doubt as there are other credible explanations, there is no financial justification for imposing such reporting obligations on companies. It will simply have no impact on CO2 emissions. It’s bad enough that companies such as Rio now have to report Scope 1 and 2 emissions, which incidentally are falling but not very rapidly. Note: please don’t start an argument with this writer about the reality of global warming and its threat to destroy the world. I do not have the time to explain the science of the matter to you. There are plenty of good internet resources on the subject.

As a shareholder in Rio I advise other shareholders to vote against these proposed resolutions at the company.

It seems likely though that the coronavirus outbreak in China might have a significant impact on CO2 emissions. Businesses are shutting down there and imports of oil/gas and other commodities are falling. China consumes half the world’s metals and prices have been falling as a result. It’s hardly surprising that the share price of Rio has been falling of late also.

The coronavirus threat and other similar plagues are probably more a threat to humanity on a global scale than any slight rise in the temperature.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Brexit – Over and Out – and Why Shareholder Votes Matter

Last night Brexit got done. We exited the EU after 47 years. Our last words to the EU bureaucrats were surely “over and out”. But we will need to resume the conversation to secure a trade deal. That still leaves room for many more arguments within the UK and with the EU.

Some people seem to think that there is a hope we might rejoin the EU some time in the future. But while the EU is dominated by bureaucrats and real democracy is so lacking in the EU institutions that seems exceedingly unlikely to me. Hope of any reform to the EU is surely forlorn.

It might be preferable to have some alignment on product and financial regulations but in the latter area the EU either follows well behind the UK anyway, or creates regulations like MIFID II that are over complex or simply incomprehensible.

One area that the EU could have been a leader in was to improve financial regulation such as on shareholder rights. They have produced a Shareholder Rights Directive but it is so badly written that it can and is being effectively ignored in the UK. Just take the area of shareholder voting and the problem of nominee accounts.

The Investors Chronicle (IC) have published an article by Mary McDougall this week entitled “Why Shareholder Votes Matter”. It shows how the nominee account system has disenfranchised most individual shareholders as they either cannot vote their shares, or it is made so difficult to do that they don’t bother.

I contributed to the IC article because I have a lot of knowledge of this area having pioneered the ShareSoc campaign on the issue and having experience of using multiple platforms over many years (see https://www.sharesoc.org/campaigns/shareholder-rights-campaign/ ).

The article mentions Sirius Minerals (SXX) which is currently subject to a takeover bid via a scheme of arrangement. A very large proportion of the shares are held by individual investors in nominee accounts but because of the voting rules on Court hearings all of them will only get one vote by the nominee operator who might not even vote at all. That’s because nominee accounts are generally “pooled” with only one name on the share register as a “Member” of the company – and that name is that of the nominee operator (i.e. the platform).

Another example that shows where votes are important is that of the forthcoming AGM scheduled for the 12th February at RWS Holdings (RWS), an AIM company. You might think that this will be a routine matter with just the standard resolutions. But not so. There is actually a resolution to waive the need for a Concert Party that might acquire more than 30% of the shares to make an offer for the company under the City Takeover Code. The Concert Party comprises Chairman Andrew Brode, Diane Brode and a Trust they control. They already hold 32.8% of the shares but as there is also a share buyback resolution that might increase their holdings, and hence trigger the need for an offer, a waiver is required. I voted against both resolutions – I always vote against share buy-backs unless there are very good reasons, and I don’t like public companies to have shareholders with more than 30%.

You can see that just a few private shareholders in nominee accounts might affect the outcome as the Concert Party cannot vote on the waiver. But will they?

Regardless I encourage shareholders in RWS to vote their shares – if you hold shares in an ISA your platform operator has a legal obligation to cast your votes.

The IC article mentions that the Law Commission is currently looking at the problems and legal uncertainties created by nominee accounts, but it also discloses that they only expect a “scoping study” on intermediated securities to be published in Autumn 2020. No great urgency there then!

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Why Shareholders Have Little Influence

There was an article in The Times newspaper this morning by Mark Atherton which covers the subject of shareholder voting and the nominee system. I am quoted as saying “The nominee system needs a total rewrite to reflect modern reality and restore shareholder democracy”.

As is pointed out in the article, only 6% of private shareholders vote the shares they own. This is mainly because of the obstruction of the nominee system. The US system is not perfect but they get 31% of shares voted. Everyone agrees that ensuring shareholders in public companies return votes for General Meetings is important. This ensures good corporate governance and “shareholder engagement”. But very few people, and hardly any institutional investors, actually attend such meetings in person. So most votes are submitted via proxies.

Fifty years ago most shares were held in the form of paper share certificates which meant two things: 1) All shareholders were on the register of the company with a name and address recorded and 2) All shareholders would be issued with a copy of the Annual Report and a paper proxy voting form. This ensured a high turnout of votes.

Due to the growth of on-line trading via “platforms” and the “dematerialisation” of shares in Crest, most shares held by “direct investors” (see below for indirect holdings) are now held in electronic form. For retail investors this means a very high proportion are held in pooled nominee accounts. This has resulted in very low numbers of investors actually voting the shares that they “nominally” own. The problem is that the nominee system obstructs both the information flow to investors and their ability to vote easily and quickly.

For institutional investors the turn-out is higher – typically above 60% but such investors often have a low interest in the outcome so tend to vote in support of all the resolutions. Institutions suffer from the “agency problem”, i.e. they are commonly not owners in their own right and thus may have other motives. For example, they may not have the same interest in controlling the pay of directors in companies which has got out of hand of late for that reason. They are keen to retain access to management which can be made difficult if they oppose management proposals or pay.

The nominee system as operated in the UK also undermines the rights of shareholders, creates major problems when stockbrokers go bust (as they regularly do) simply because of the legal uncertainty of who owns the shares. The “pooled” nominee system is particularly dangerous because it means that it is impossible to know who owns which shares in a company.

The nominee system also undermines shareholder democracy (i.e. the influence of shareholders on companies). When every direct investor was on the share register of a company, under the Companies Act one has the right to obtain the register so as to write to all shareholders to raise your concerns or invite support or resolutions (e.g. if a requisition to remove or add directors has been submitted). This is now almost impossible to do as the register simply contains mainly a list of nominee names and the nominee operator will not pass on communications to their clients. The other problem associated with the current system is that it makes it very difficult for even the companies themselves to communicate with their own shareholders.

The high cost of postage also now frustrates communication with shareholders except for very wealthy organisations or individuals. The Companies Act has really not been updated to reflect the modern digital world and the reality of how markets operate and how shares are now held and traded via electronic platforms. It needs a total rewrite to reflect modern reality and restore shareholder democracy.

Many investors and savers now hold shares indirectly via their interest in pension funds, insurance funds or mutual funds of various kinds (OEICS etc).

At the end of 2014, and based on “beneficial” ownership, the Office of National Statistics indicated that individuals held 11.9% by value of shares listed on the LSE. That compares with 16.0% held by pension funds, insurance companies and other financial institutions. But 53.8% of shares were held by foreign investors, which presumably would also be mainly held by institutions. Direct ownership had been falling for many years but seems to have increased somewhat lately perhaps due to more interest in “self-select” ISAs.

Institutions do suffer from the “agency” problem mentioned above and the underlying investors have little influence over the actions of the investment managers. Indeed one problem with funds is that investors often know little about what the fund is invested in – see the recent problems at the Woodford Equity Income Fund for example which most holders of the fund simply did not know about until it was too late. Pension funds are even less “transparent”. This results in perverse outcomes. For example a trade union pension fund might have no influence on the affairs of companies in which the fund is invested even though that might be of very direct interest to the union members.

Mark Atherton suggests investors in funds should have the right to influence how fund managers vote the shares in the fund. But how to enable underlying investors in funds to influence how the fund manager votes their shares, or otherwise influences a company, is an exceedingly complex and difficult problem. Funds can own interests in hundreds of companies and have hundreds of thousands of underlying investors. The latter are never likely to understand or take a close interest in the affairs of individual companies held by a fund. One reason they are investing in funds is so they can ignore the details and rely on the fund manager to look after corporate governance issues.

Even direct investors often don’t bother to vote because they don’t wish to spend time considering the issues or filling out the forms. Making it easier to do the latter by providing on-line voting systems would help but would only be a partial solution. Some collective representation of private investors (such as by organisations such as ShareSoc) might be one answer. Investors would simply give ShareSoc a standing mandate to represent them. But that is currently impossible because of the nominee system as the investors cannot appoint proxies themselves – only the nominee operator can do so.

Clearly it would help to encourage direct investment rather than reliance on funds. This would reduce investors costs (intermediation costs take a very high proportion of investment returns in public companies). Note that the risk of amateur investors underperforming the professionals should be discounted. Professional fund managers mostly perform no better than a monkey with a pin and many funds are now “tracker” funds that simply follow an index. Tracker funds are particularly problematic regarding shareholder democracy as they have no interest in influencing management whatsoever. Their share trading is solely influenced by the market, not by their views on the merits of the company or its management.

The UK, although we have one of the largest stock markets in the world, has very poor legal and operational systems for recording and representing shareholder interests. This probably has arisen from our tendency to stick with Victorian traditions when we were the leader in such matters. The Companies Act, which was last revised in 2006, still primarily assumes paper processes with rather half-baked additions to support digital systems. Stockbrokers have avoided regulation and as a result have implemented electronic nominee systems that protect their own interests rather than that of their clients in ensuring shareholder rights and democracy.

Major reform is needed!

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

More information:

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Intermediated Securities – You Need to Respond

The Law Commission is undertaking a review of Intermediated Securities. What’s this about and why is it important? It is important because the use of nominee accounts has undermined your rights as a shareholder in public companies.

Nominee accounts have made it difficult to vote your shares at General Meetings, taken away other rights, and defeated shareholder democracy. The inability of companies or anyone else to communicate with all shareholders has also made it exceedingly difficult to tackle management when they are paying themselves too much or are simply not acting in shareholders interests. Individual shareholders have been particularly damaged by the use of nominee accounts which have taken over from paper share certificates for most holdings.

Another issue is that an EU Directive will soon be mandating “dematerialisation” of share certificates. All trading will need to be done in electronic form which implies nominee accounts only unless you happen to have a Personal Crest account (of which there are only 5,000 now) or unless a new “name on register” electronic account is devised.

ShareSoc has issued some information on the Law Commission public consultation on Intermediated Securities which you can read here: https://www.sharesoc.org/sharesoc-news/law-commission-review-of-intermediated-securities-consultation/

IT IS REALLY IMPORTANT THAT AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE RESPOND TO THIS CONSULTATION SO PLEASE DO SO!

You can read my personal submission to this consultation here: https://www.roliscon.com/Intermediated-Securities-Consultation.pdf

One interesting point made in the Commissions consultation document is that it says “intermediaries are obliged to offer investors the option of a segregated account” – see page 8. This is now EU law and I understand it is effective in the UK. That means that all ISA and SIPP holders should be offered the option of a segregated, i.e. designated,  account where your name and address are held on the share register and not just the nominee operator’s. Such accounts are much better than “pooled” nominee accounts which almost all brokers use at present and which are positively dangerous as your assets are not separately identified. That means that when your broker goes bust there is frequently a shortfall and recovery of your assets in full is not easy. I am looking into whether my ISA and SIPP operators actually are compliant with the EU legislation and do offer designated accounts. I will advise later on the answer.

However a designated nominee account is still not the ideal solution – all shareholders need to be on the share register of a company, which is what my consultation submission says.

PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU SUPPORT SHARESOC AND RESPOND TO THE LAW COMMISSION’S CALL FOR EVIDENCE

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

 

Removing Directors, Ventus VCTs, Rent Controls and HS2

Replacing the directors of companies by shareholders can be enormously difficult. Although I have been instrumental in the past in helping that process in several companies, it takes enormous effort and a lengthy timescale to achieve it. ShareSoc director Cliff Weight has published a very perceptive article on the problems of doing so at the Ventus VCTs.

Problems faced by shareholders who are unhappy with the directors of a company are a) communicating with all other shareholders now that many are in nominee accounts and the costly process of writing to shareholders on the register via post (and processing the register into usable format for mailing); b) the existing directors of a company using the resources of the company (i.e. shareholders funds) to campaign actively against any change including the use of expensive proxy advisors to contact shareholders via telephone; c) the role of IFAs who advise their clients or who manage their portfolios and who can influence the shareholder voting; and d) the inertia of institutional investors (or to quote someone from the FT today: about 60% of company investors are passive shareholders and ‘don’t care’).

In the case of the Ventus VCTs, some shareholders are unhappy with the management fees as no new investments are being made by the company and are unhappy with the actions of the directors. They have tabled requisitions for the Annual General Meetings at Ventus VCT and Ventus 2 VCT on the 8th August to remove all the directors and appoint new ones. Of particular concern is the current two-year termination notice on the management agreement which is now being proposed to extend further. It is never a good idea for investment trusts to have long termination periods in contracts with the manager.

You can read Cliff Weight’s blog article here: https://tinyurl.com/y2de9vaa . There is also an article covering this topic in this weeks Investor’s Chronicle under the title “Limits of Influence”. It’s well worth reading.

How to solve these problems? I suggest the following: a) a reform to put all shareholders (including beneficial owners) on the register of companies; b) put shareholders email addresses on the register so that communicating with them can be done at reasonable cost – it’s surely unreasonable in the modern age to only have postal addresses which adds to costs enormously; c) limit how much can be spent on proxy advisors to oppose shareholder requisitions; and d) exclude passive institutional investors who have no interest as owners from voting.

Rent Controls

The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, is intending to develop proposals for rent controls in London so as to “stabilise” or reduce property rents in London (or make them “more affordable” as he puts it). That’s despite the fact that he has no legal powers to do so and a Conservative government would likely block such proposals. But Jeremy Corbyn supports the idea. The Mayor clearly sees this as a vote winner for his re-election campaign next year as he claims 68% of Londoner’s support rent controls!

Some of my readers probably invest in buy-to-let properties so such proposals will worry them considerably. On the other hand, those who rent houses or flats in London are undoubtedly concerned about the cost of renting and the rapid rise in rents in London. Some are being forced out of London or have to move to smaller properties.

But rent controls never work and create all kinds of negative side-effects, or unintended consequences. When I moved to London in the 1960s, rent controls were in place and had been since 1945 in various forms (there is good coverage of the history of rent controls in London on Wikipedia). In the 1960s, unfurnished properties were almost impossible to find or were horribly expensive as landlords had withdrawn from the market. Rachmanism to force tenants out of rent controlled properties was also rife and what property there was available for rent on the market was often in very poor condition because landlords simply could not justify spending money on maintenance. We definitely do not want to return to the 1960s despite Jeremy Corbyn’s desire to put us there!

Rent controls are not the answer, as many studies of such schemes has shown. The Mayor needs to do more to tackle the housing problem in London by ensuring more home are built, encouraging movement of people out of London, and discouraging new immigration into the capital from elsewhere. But you can read the Mayor’s press release here if you wish to learn more about his plans: https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/to-tackle-affordability-crisis

HS2 and Brexit

The latest report that HS2 may cost an extra £30bn, meaning it could cost as much as £85bn in total, surely makes it even less justifiable. Enabling a very few people to save a few minutes on the train journey time from London to Birmingham at that cost makes no sense, although there might be more justification for expanding capacity and speed on routes in the North of England. However, it would surely be much better to spend that kind of money on an improved road network where the benefits are much greater. The Alliance of British Drivers has just published an analysis of road expenditure versus taxation which includes a comparison of road versus rail expenditure. It’s well worth reading – see here: https://www.abd.org.uk/road-investment-and-road-user-taxation-the-truth/ .

Now the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) have recently suggested that a “no-deal” Brexit would blow a £30bn hole in the public finances. Even if you accept that is true, and many do not, there appears to be a simple solution therefore. Cancel HS2 just to be on the safe side.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

 

LoopUp Profit Warning and Brexit Party Policy

Conference calling AIM company LoopUp (LOOP) issued a trading statement this morning which contained a profit warning. At the time of writing the share price is down 47% on the day but it has been falling sharply in recent days which suggests the bad news had already leaked out.

This is an example of what happens when lofty growth expectations are revised downwards. Revenue is now expected to be down 7% on the previous market consensus and EBITDA down 20%. The company blames the shortfall on “subdued revenue across its long-term customer base” driven by macro-economic factors and diversion of sales staff into training new ones.

LoopUp is presenting at the ShareSoc seminar event on the 10th July so it will be interesting to hear what they have to say about this – see https://www.sharesoc.org/events/sharesoc-growth-company-seminar-in-london-10-july-2019/ . This news comes only a month after LoopUp held a Capital Markets Day when there was no hint of these problems. I did a report on that here: https://roliscon.blog/2019/06/07/broker-charges-proven-vct-performance-fee-and-loopup-seminar/

I do hold a few shares in LoopUp but thankfully not many.

Brexit Party Policy

I mentioned in a recent blog post that the Brexit Party is looking for policy suggestions to enable them to develop a platform for any prospective General Election. Here’s what I sent them with respect to financial matters:

  1. The personal taxation system is way too complicated and needs drastically simplifying. At the lower end the tax credit system is wide open to fraud while those on low incomes are taxed when they should not be. The personal tax allowance, both the basic rates, and higher rates, need to be raised to take more people out of tax altogether.
  2. The taxation of capital gains is also now too complicated, while tax is paid on capital gains that simply arise from inflation, which are not real gains at all. They should revert to being indexed as they were some years ago. For almost anyone, calculating your own tax that is payable is now way too difficult and hence requiring the paid services of accountants using specialist software.
  3. Inheritance tax is another over-complex system that wealthy people avoid by taking expert advice while the middle class end up paying it. It certainly needs grossly simplifying, or scrapping altogether as a relatively small amount of tax is actually collected from it.
  4. The taxation of businesses is inequitable with the growth of the internet. Small businesses, particularly retailers, pay a disproportionate level of tax in business rates while their internet competitors often avoid VAT via imports. VAT is now wide open to fraud and other types of abuse such as under-declarations, partly because of the EU VAT arrangements. VAT is in principle a simple tax and the alternative of a sales tax would create anomalies but VAT does need to be reformed and simplified.
  5. All the above tax simplifications would enable HMRC to be reduced in size and the time wasted in form filling by individuals and businesses reduced. Everyone would be a winner, and wasted resources and expenditure reduced.
  6. The taxation of company dividends on shares is now an example of the same profits being taxed twice – once in Corporation Tax on the company, and then again when those profits are distributed to shareholders. This has been enormously damaging to those who receive dividends and the lack of tax credits has also undermined defined benefit pension funds. The taxation of dividends should revert to how it once was.
  7. The regulation of companies and financial institutions needs very substantial reform with much tougher laws against fraud on investors. Not only are the current laws weak but the enforcement of them by the FCA/FRC is too slow and ineffective. Although some reforms have recently been proposed, they do not go far enough. Individual directors and senior managers in companies are not held to account for gross errors or downright fraud, or when they are, they get off too lightly. We need a much more effective system like they have in the USA, and better laws.
  8. Shareholder rights as regards voting and the receipt of information have been undermined by the use of nominee accounts. This has made it difficult for individual shareholders to vote and that is one reason why investors have not been able to control the excesses in director pay recently. The system of shareholding and voting needs reform, with changes to the Companies Act to bring it into the modern electronic world.
  9. The pay of directors and senior managers in companies and other organisations has got wildly out of hand in recent years, thus generating a lot of criticism by the lower paid. This has created social divisions and led partly to the rise of extreme left socialist tendencies. This problem needs tackling.
  10. Governance of companies needs to be reformed to ensure that directors do not set their own pay, as happens at present, but that shareholders and other stakeholders do so. Likewise shareholders and other stakeholders should appoint the directors.
  11. Insolvency law needs reform to outlaw “pre-pack” administrations which have been very damaging to many small businesses. They are an abuse of insolvency law.
  12. All the EU Directives on financial regulation should be scrapped (i.e. there should be no “harmonization” with EU regulations after Brexit). The MIFID regulations have added enormous costs to financial institutions, which have passed on their costs to their customers, with no very obvious benefit to anyone. Likewise the Shareholder Rights Directive might have had good objectives but the implementation has been poor because of the lack of knowledge on how financial markets operate in the UK. Other examples are the UCITS regulations which have not stopped Neil Woodford from effectively bypassing them, or the PRIIPS regulations which have resulted in misleading information being provided to investors.

Let me know if you have other suggestions, and of course the above policies might be good for adoption by other political parties in addition.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Shareholder Rights Being Eroded

There is a good article in the Financial Times today (Saturday 22/6/2019) which is headlined “UK shareholder rights being eroded”. As the article says, almost no investors who buy shares legally own the shares they have bought, which rather surprises them. That’s because most of them buy via nominee accounts operated by stockbrokers and platforms. Not only that, but most nominee accounts are “pooled” accounts so even identifying who are the “beneficial owners” is not always easy.

Does it matter? Yes it does as investors apparently holding shares via Beaufort Securities soon found out, and there have been a number of similar cases. If brokers go bust or cease trading, your investments will be frozen and reclaiming them may not be easy. It also undermines your rights to vote, to attend AGMs and other rights that those on the share register of the company have as “Members”.

The Law Commission has announced a review of this system – see here for more details: https://tinyurl.com/yyhm3mf9 .

There are some good quotations from Cliff Weight of ShareSoc and Peter Parry of UKSA in the FT article. However there is this quote from Russ Mould of AJ Bell: “It is debatable whether this [nominee account system] makes it harder for shareholders to cast their votes any more than the old paper share certificate regime”. That is clearly wrong as those on the register can easily vote via submitting a paper proxy form or via the registrars’ on-line systems. Submitting votes if you are in a nominee account is rarely so simple and AJ Bell do not provide an easy to use method so it would require significant effort by investors to vote. The result is that most do not bother.

The other claim in the article is that the nominee account system has made trading easier and cheaper. That is not true either. The electronic Personal Crest system is a better alternative and as all trades go through Crest anyway (even those done via a nominee account), there is no cost difference in reality. The reason brokers and platforms have promoted nominee accounts is simply because there are other commercial advantages for them.

There is a lot more information on this subject which explains the real facts and includes a video from me on the subject on the ShareSoc web site here: https://www.sharesoc.org/campaigns/shareholder-rights-campaign/

A minimal if partial solution to this problem would be to have all beneficial owners on the share register. But in reality the whole system needs reforming so that investors are not forced into nominee accounts where they lose a lot of their legal rights, and shareholder democracy is fatally undermined.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Royal Bank of Scotland AGM – How to Vote

Shareholders in the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) will have received their Annual Report and Notice of the AGM in the post today. The meeting is on the 25th April for those in a nominee account, and its being held at the RBS headquarters in Scotland of course.

There are 28 resolutions on the Agenda. Please ensure that you vote your shares. Resolution Number 28 directs the board to appoint a Shareholder Committee and was put forward jointly by ShareSoc and UKSA. The board has again opposed that resolution on spurious grounds. A Shareholder Committee would provide a say on such matters as director nominations, remuneration and strategy and that resolution should be supported by all thinking shareholders. See this document for more explanation and a list of the resolutions: https://www.investors.rbs.com/~/media/Files/R/RBS-IR/results-center/letter-to-shareholders-2019.pdf

Corporate governance at RBS is still poor and a Shareholder Committee would cure that. The Financial Times today highlighted one remuneration issue which is that the CEO, Ross McEwan will receive a pension contribution this year of 35% of salary, i.e. £350,000. This seems to be the latest wheeze to avoid scrutiny of high pay with other major UK banks paying similar amounts. So another recommendation is to vote against the Remuneration Report (Resolution No. 2).

Personally I will also be voting against the authorisation of share buy-backs (Resolutions 26 and 27), and against the resolution that permits General Meetings at 14 days notice (No. 24), as I always do.

I will also be voting against the Chairman Howard Davies (Resolution 5) for opposing Resolution 28.

For more information see the ShareSoc blog item here: https://www.sharesoc.org/sharesoc-news/vote-for-rbs-agm-special-resolution-28-shareholder-committee/

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Placings at Gordon Dadds and Blue Prism

There were two placings announced yesterday. The first was by legal firm Gordon Dadds (GOR). I held a very few shares in the company. This company had already annoyed me by suspending the listing of the shares for several months while they finalised an acquisition deal. Totally unnecessary. If Northern Rock could remain listed while in their death throws, the propensity to suspend shares simply because there is more uncertainty about the business is not justified. This annoyance also arose at Patisserie (CAKE) recently. Investors can decide for themselves whether they want to hold the shares, and possibly take more risk, or not.

The placing by Gordon Dadds was also annoying. Apart from the dilution of 25%, it was a placing at a price of about 25% below the market price. Needless to say, this was taken up by institutional investors very promptly indeed while, as usual, private investors had no opportunity to do so. There did not seem to be any great urgency in this fund raising as it was simply to provide “financial flexibility” for their acquisition strategy. So why no full rights issue or open offer?

I simply do not wish to hold shares in companies that treat their investors this way. Those that do tend to be repeat offenders. So I sold the shares I held.

Another interesting placing was in Blue Prism (PRSM) a fast-growing supplier of office automation software, which I do not hold. The company also announced their full year results for the year to October. Revenue more than doubled to £55 million, but losses went up in a similar proportion to £26 million. The market cap is now an incredible £939 million (i.e. 17 times sales revenue).

Their placing was aimed at raising £100 million and was got away at 1100p (no significant discount to recent price but way down on a few months back). The purpose of the placing was given as this: “The Group is seeking to capitalise on the market opportunity available by accelerating its investments in distribution, its product and platform whilst maintaining its thought leadership in the RPA market.”

So it’s interesting to compare this approach with the position of Cloudcall (CALL) previously discussed who might expand faster if they raised more funds but are also loss making. Clearly Blue Prism intend to take the US approach and try to grab market leadership in a relatively new and potentially large market, i.e. it’s a land grab. This can work but the risk is that competitors who are more cost efficient can erode market share and often they all end up losing money until reality sinks in. Is what Blue Prism is doing that difficult to replicate by competitors? I do not know enough about their product to judge that but the share price and risk are too high for me.

It’s worth bearing in mind that in the software world you can sell almost anything with a good story if you spend enough. Whether such sales are really profitable can be very difficult to judge when money is also being spent at the same time to expand the business.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Bellway AGM for Early Risers Only

Should Annual General Meetings of companies be held at reasonably convenient locations and on convenient dates and times so that as many shareholders as possible can attend? Most private shareholders certainly think so. But Bellway (BWY) seem to be taking the opposite approach.

Their 2016 AGM was at the very sensible and easily achievable time of 2pm in the afternoon so all shareholders hoping to attend could actually meet the directors and ask questions. They could travel from all over the country and even have time for lunch!

But this year’s AGM kicks off at 8.30 am on Wednesday 12 December 2018 at Jesmond Dene House Hotel, Jesmond Dene, Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 2EY.

So what changed….Do directors at Bellway not want shareholders any more….maybe the huge remuneration at housebuilders and recent furore at Persimmon has made directors devise cunning plans to avoid awkward questions and attention from the media.

This anti-shareholder mindset seemed to set in last year with an early morning start at 9.30 am in Newcastle but still six shareholders made it through the doors. That must have been too many for the directors because this year they have moved it even earlier. They have moved it closer to breakfast for those who like to vote whilst eating their cornflakes.

Here’s hoping that the 2019 AGM is not held at 7.30am and that at least one shareholder will make it through the early morning fog on the Tyne !!

But it is simply not acceptable for boards to take this approach. There are too few shareholders attend AGMs already without deliberately making it difficult for them. I suggest that perhaps the UK Corporate Governance Code should be modified to include coverage of when and where AGMs should be held and other aspects of how they are run (such as the answering of questions which I covered in a previous article).

Thanks to David Stredder for notes on the above events.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.