JESC and WPCT – Much in Common

Last week I received the Annual Report of JP Morgan European Smaller Companies Trust (JESC) which I have held since 2012. It has a good long-term performance but last year was disappointing. Net asset value return of minus 7.5% which is worse than their benchmark of minus 3.6%. The share price did even worse and it is now on a discount to NAV of nearly 15% as the discount has widened. The under-performance was attributed to poor stock selection.

The Chairman, Carolan Dobson, is stepping down at the AGM this year after nine years’ service. I did not support her re-election last year as I thought she had too many jobs. She is also the Chair of The Brunner Investment Trust plc, Baillie Gifford UK Growth plc , BlackRock Latin American Investment Trust plc and a director of Woodford Patient Capital Trust (WPCT). You have probably been reading much about the latter of later given Neil Woodford’s difficulties.

The Annual Report of JESC says “The Trust’s excellent longer-term performance remains intact” which is a very questionable statement. JESC is an actively managed fund and the manager says “The investment process is driven by bottom-up stock selection with a focus on identifying market leading growth companies with a catalyst for outperformance”, i.e. it’s a stock picking model like the Woodford funds.

Last year that clearly has not worked. Perhaps it is because of a new focus on environmental, social and governance factors (ESG) which has been “rigorously integrated into their investment process”. They have also been “selectively adding cyclical companies back into the portfolio where valuations have become attractive”.

I will be unable to attend the AGM on the 10th July but I think shareholders who do need to question whether this is another stock-picking manager who has lost his touch like Woodford.

On WPCT there was an interesting article today (Saturday 15/6/2019) on Industrial Heat, an unlisted company which is the biggest holding in the fund. The company is valued at almost $1 billion after a new round of fund raising. The company is focused on cold fusion which nobody has yet proved to be a viable technology and the FT article is somewhat of a hatchet job on the business. It all looks exceedingly dubious and I could not find any detailed review of the technology that the company is claiming or much information on the company at all.

I think the boards of both WPCT and JESC need to start asking some tough questions of their fund managers. Such as “convince me why these companies in the portfolio are good investments?”.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Paying Illegal Dividends, Burford Capital, Woodford Patient Capital Trust and Zero Carbon Objective

A group of investors including Sarasin, Legal & General, Hermes and the UK Shareholders Association (UKSA) has written to Sir Donald Brydon who is undertaking a review of the audit market. They have yet again raised the question of whether the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) are consistent with UK company law. In particular they question whether profits are sometimes being recognised, thus allowing the payment of illegal dividends. The particular issue is whether profits can arise on certain transactions under IFRS from transactions between parent and subsidiary companies or by the use of “mark to market” accounting. The problem is “unrealised profits” that might turn into cash in the future, but may not.

This may appear a somewhat technical question, but it can in practice lead to over-optimistic reporting of profits, leading to excessive bonus payments to managers, and the general misleading of investors. Actually calculating when a dividend can be paid as dividends are not supposed to be paid out of capital is not easy and is not self-evident to investors. The published accounts do not make it obvious. Regular mistakes are made by companies requiring later “whitewash” resolutions to be passed by shareholders. The ICAEW has previously rejected complaints on this issue but it is surely an area that requires more examination.

Incidentally I was reading a book yesterday entitled “White Collar Crime in Modern England” (from 1845-1929) which is most enlightening on common frauds that arose when limited companies became popular – many of the frauds still persist. In the “railway mania” of the 1840s it was common to set up companies and raise the capital to build a railway when the chance of it operating profitably was low. To keep the share price high, and the directors in jobs, dividends were paid out of capital. To quote from the book: “unscrupulous directors could easily pay dividends out of capital undetected – projecting a false image of profitability and enticing further investment in their lines”. That was an era when auditors did not have to be accountants and were often simply the directors’ cronies. Standards and regulations have improved since then, but there are still problems in this area that need solving.

There was an interesting discussion on Twitter recently on Burford Capital (BUR) with regard to their accounting methods. Not that I am an expert on the company as I do not hold shares in it, it but as I understand it they recognise the likely future settlements from the litigation funding cases they take on. In other words, they estimate future cash flows based on projections of likely winning the case and the possible settlements. As I said on Twitter, lawyers will often tell you a case is winnable but they will also tell you the outcome of any legal case is uncertain.

It’s interesting to read what Burford say in their Annual Report under accounting policies where it spells it out: “Owing to the illiquid nature of these investments, the assessment of fair valuation is highly subjective and requires a number of significant and complex judgements to be made by management. The exit value will be determined for each investment by the contractual entitlement, the underlying risk profile of the litigation, a trial or an appellate outcome or other case events, any other agreements in respect of settlement discussions or negotiations as well as the credit risk associated with the investment value and any relevant secondary market activity”.

The auditors no doubt scrutinise the reasonableness of the estimates but any outside investor in the shares of the company will have great difficulty in doing so.

Neil Woodford’s Equity Income Fund has a big holding in Burford Capital. I commented on the Woodford Patient Capital Trust yesterday here: https://roliscon.blog/2019/06/11/woodford-patient-capital-trust-is-it-an-opportunity/ and suggested the Trust made a mistake in naming the Trust after him. It makes it more difficult to fire the manager for example. But the FT reported this morning that the Trust has indeed had conversations about doing just that. Woodford’s firm has a contract that only requires 3 months’ notice which is a good thing. At least they can keep the “Patient Capital” moniker because investors in this trust have already had to wait a long time for much return and it could take even longer to improve its performance under a new manager. But as Lex in the FT said, “patience is now in short supply” so far as investors are concerned.

Another major item of news yesterday was soon to be ex-Prime Minister May’s commitment to enshrine in law a target for net zero carbon emissions in the UK by 2050. This is surely a quite suicidal path for the UK to follow when most other major countries, including all the big polluters, will be very unlikely to follow suit. Even Chancellor Philip Hammond has said it will cost about £1 trillion. It will effectively make the UK completely uncompetitive in many products with production and jobs shifting to other countries. We might become the first really “de-industrialised” country which is not a lead that many will follow, and it will actually be practically very difficult to achieve if you bother to study what is required to achieve zero emissions. It will completely change the way we live with the transport network being a particular problem (trains, planes and road vehicles).

As I have said before, if we really want to cut air pollution and CO2 emissions, then we need to reduce the population as well as rely on such wheezes as electrification of the transport and energy systems. Mrs May’s last act as Prime Minister might be to commit the UK to economic suicide. It might not be a good time to invest in UK manufacturing companies.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Woodford Patient Capital Trust – Is it an Opportunity?

Neil Woodford’s problems at his Equity Income Fund which have caused the fund to close to redemptions have been filling up the pages of the financial press in the last few days. The fact that his reputation is now in tatters has spread like a contagion to others including to Hargreaves Lansdown (HL.) as they effectively recommended the fund (HL. share price is down 22% since May 16). It’s also affected the share prices of holdings in the fund portfolio as investors anticipate that he will have to dump some of his holdings in a fire sale to meet redemptions when the fund reopens.

Another company that has suffered is Woodford Patient Capital Trust (WPCT) which is an investment trust managed by the Woodford firm. It’s down 29% since mid-May and now trades at a discount to net asset value of 27% according to the AIC. That’s quite unusual for any investment trust who can typically control the discount by share buy-backs and other means. The shares are even being shorted by speculators according to a report in the FT which is again unusual for an investment trust. Is this a speculative buying opportunity I wondered? So I took a quick look at the company, and have read the last Annual Report (to December 2018).

This is an unusual trust in many ways. The company has an objective to deliver “a return in excess of 10 per cent per annum over the longer term”. That statement is a hostage to fortune if I ever saw one. It achieved a 6.9% increase in NAV last year, but is down over the last 3 years overall.

It has a peculiar management fee with a low base cost of 0.2% but a performance fee where the manager gets 15% of any excess returns over a 10% cumulative hurdle rate per annum, subject to a high watermark. That’s the kind of management fee that would put me off investing normally.

This is an interesting summary of the trust in the Annual Report: “WPCT has a unique portfolio of companies, developed over a long period, where the Portfolio Manager has a deep insight into the evolution of the businesses. Many of these companies are now in the commercialisation phase. For example, Proton Partners, the UK’s first high-energy proton beam therapy provider, treated 25 patients in its Cancer Centre in Newport last year and opened two further centres in Northumberland and Reading. Autolus successfully listed on NASDAQ and its CAR-T cell technology is in a strong position to drive advances in the battle against cancer. Meanwhile, one of the Company’s largest holdings, Industrial Heat, raised capital from external investors having shown positive progress and it is anticipating reaching a key milestone in the year ahead. Companies within the portfolio are also attracting high-calibre individuals, typified by the senior appointments at Immunocore.”

The trust consists of a portfolio of smaller companies, mainly unlisted but with some listed with a heavy emphasis on healthcare, financials and technology. The largest holdings given on the latest data sheet are Benevolent AI, Oxford Nanopore, Autolus, Atom Bank, Proton Partners, Industrial Heat, Immunocore A, Oxford Sciences Innovation, Industrial Heat A1 Pref and Mission Therapeutics. You only have to look at a few of these to realise that even where listed, the valuations might be problematic, and for unlisted ones that’s even more so. These are early stage companies in most cases.

It’s rather like a VCT portfolio except with even bigger bets on the longer-term prospects of the companies. Lots of comments about positive prospects, increasing promise and making operational milestones in the reviews in the Annual Report but little mention of profits. Page 19 tells you that 65% of the portfolio is unquoted, with 80% classed as “early stage” companies. The trust also employs gearing of up to 20%.

The Board of Directors looks experienced but they are also the typical “great and good” of the investment world, including one Dame, with lots of jobs – too many perhaps.

The trust issued a reassuring statement for investors yesterday. It said “The Board is pleased with the operational progress of its portfolio companies, which the Board believes continue to have the potential to deliver attractive returns, in line with the long-term mandate of the Company. The operational performance of these businesses is not impacted by recent events”. But it acknowledged the impact of events at the Woodford Equity Income Fund and on the share prices of investee companies.

I could spend days analysing the companies in the trust’s portfolio to see whether the valuations made any sense, and still be not much wiser about their real prospects. I am not sure it’s worth the effort. Does the trust have enough cash to undertake any large tender offer or share buy-back is probably more relevant and also meet the needs for more investment typically required by early stage companies? I doubt it.

Regrettably I think the name of Woodford on the trust could cause it to continue to trade at a deep discount even though there is clearly a team of people running the portfolio. It is never a good idea for a fund or trust to name themselves after the fund manager or his company, even if that was a major selling point when first launched.

Trust shares are always tradeable, at least unless a company asks for its shares to be suspended because of doubts about its finances. But the share price discount is driven by investor sentiment and I don’t think the view of this company among investors is going to be very positive for some time.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

 

Woodford Equity Income Fund Suspension – Analysis and Solutions

The business media is awash with analysis and comment on the closure of the Woodford Equity Income Fund to redemptions – meaning investors cannot take their money out, much to their dismay. I write as an innocent bystander as I have never held any of the Woodford managed funds.

But I have not been totally unaffected by the problem of investors taking their money out, which has led to the suspension, because it has resulted in Woodford needing to sell some of the fund holdings. One of the few companies in his portfolio I hold, and have done for a long time, is Paypoint (PAY). The share price of that company fell in the last 2 days probably because Woodford has been selling it – about 1% of the company yesterday for example reported in an RNS announcement. Paypoint share price has been rising recently so this looks like a case of selling a winner rather than a loser, which is never a good investment strategy.

Standing back and looking at the Woodford Equity Income Fund, even its name seems quite inappropriate. Income funds tend to be stacked up with high dividend paying, defensive stocks. But many of the holdings in the portfolio look very speculative and many pay no dividends. These are the top ten holdings last reported:

Barratt Developments (7.5%), Burford Capital (5.8%), Taylor Wimpey (5.4%), Provident Financial (4.8%), Theravance Biopharma (4.7%), Benevolent AI (4.5%), IP Group (3.3%), Autolus (3.1%), Countryside Properties (3.1%) and Oxford Nanopore (2.6%). Other holdings are Kier (recent profit warning dropped the share price by 40%), NewRiver Reit (I sold it from my portfolio in early 2018 as I could not see how it could avoid the fall out on the High Street), Purplebricks (a speculation which I held briefly but concluded it was unlikely to succeed and was grossly overvalued) and Imperial Brands (a bet on a product which kills people). He is also stacked up with house building companies and estate agents – a sector that many people have exited from including me as house prices look unsustainable with the threat of higher interest rates. However you look at it, the Woodford portfolio is contrarian in the extreme. It even includes some unlisted companies which are totally illiquid and not good holdings for an open-ended fund where investor redemptions force share sales.

The last time big funds closed to redemptions were in the property sector where owning buildings in a downturn showed that the structure of open-funded funds was simply inappropriate for certain types of holdings. Much better to have those in an investment trust where fund investor sales do not force portfolio sales on the manager.

Note that another reason I prefer Investment Trusts to Open-Ended Funds is that they have independent directors who can, and do occasionally, fire the fund manager if things are obviously going wrong.

Part of the problem has been that despite the poor performance of the Woodford Equity Income Fund over the last 3 years (minus 17% versus plus 23% for the IA UK All Companies Index, and ranked 248 out of 248!), platforms such as Hargreaves Lansdown and wealth advisors were still promoting the fund based on Woodford’s historic reputation at Invesco. So investors have been sucked in, or stayed in on the promise of the fund’s investment bets coming good in due course.

What should be done about the problem now? That’s undoubtedly the key concern for investors in the fund. Even if the fund re-opens to redemptions, folks will still want out because they will have lost confidence in Woodford as a fund manager.

It has been suggested in the media that investors might be pacified if fund management fees were waived for a period of time. But that’s just a token gesture to my mind.

I would suggest some other alternatives: 1) That Neil Woodford appoint someone else to manage the fund – either an external fund management firm or a new fund management team and leader. Neil Woodford needs to withdraw from acting as fund manager and preferably remove his name from the fund; 2) Alternatively that a fund wind-up is announced in a planned manner; 3) Or a takeover/merger with another fund be organised – but that would not be easy as the current portfolio is not one that anyone else would want.

One difficulty though is that with such large funds (and it’s still relatively large even after having shrunk considerably), changing the direction and holdings in the fund takes time. So there is unlikely to be any short-term pain relief for investors. Smaller investors should probably get out as soon as they can, but the big institutional investors may not find it so easy.

If readers have any other solutions, please comment.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

 

Mello Trust and Funds Event and ShareSoc AGM

I managed to attend part of the Mello Trust and Funds Event in West London yesterday and although I had other commitments today, I may manage to attend the second day of the main Mello 2019 event tomorrow. If you have not attended one of these events before, it is definitely worth doing so. The only slight criticism I would have is that getting to Chiswick from South East London where I live via the slow District Line is not great. The wonders of the London transport network meant it almost took me two hours to get there. I’ll give a brief report on the sessions I attended, and what particularly interested me:

There was a good presentation by the young and enthusiastic George Cooke on the Montanaro European Smaller Companies Trust (MTE). This is a company I had not come across before and it looks to have a good performance record. It’s a stock pickers fund in essence but Mr Cooke’s approach to small cap company research seems similar to mine. However he covers the whole of Europe whereas my focus on direct investments is the UK. I will take a more in-depth look at this company.

I attended a panel session on investing in small cap funds and one member of the audience questioned why one would do so when you can invest in the companies directly. Here are two possible reasons: It can give you exposure to geographic or sector areas that you cannot adequately research oneself (as in MTE), and for UK funds it is always interesting to see what the high-performing fund managers are buying and selling even if you only get a limited view. That’s why I invest both directly in companies and in funds.

I also attended a presentation by Carl Harald Janson on International Biotechnology Trust (IBT) a company I already hold so I did not learn a great deal new. This is a sector specialist with a good track record and it is now paying dividends out of capital which has help to close the discount to NAV when it used to be quite high. The discount is now negligible.

Several stand staffers in the exhibit area tried to sell me “income” funds but that proved difficult as I had to tell them I never buy income funds. For long-term returns, growth funds usually provide better performance and you can always sell a few shares to produce cash income – and you may be better off tax-wise also as a result. But many people buy funds for retirement income so they are attracted by the “income” name. This is where more financial education might be beneficial.

The last presentation I saw was by Nick Britton of the AIC (Association of Investment Companies who represent investment companies). Their web site is always useful for researching investment trusts and their past performance, which I tend to prefer as against open-ended funds although I do own a few of the latter.

Nick covered the differences between the two types of funds (open versus closed). His presentation suggested that closed-end funds consistently performed better for several reasons and he compared some funds of both types run by the same manager as evidence. There are a number of reasons why closed-end funds perform better in the long term and I was convinced by the statistics on this a long time ago. But Nick gave some more data on the subject.

So why do open-ended funds dominate the fund industry (£1.2 trillion versus £189 billion funds under management)? I rather expected that after the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) that platforms would no longer have a strong financial incentive to promote open-ended funds but it seems there are other reasons remaining which are not exactly clear. But it’s the investors who are suckered into buying open-ended funds who should know better. Like in most markets, folks buy what they are sold rather than do their own research and buy the best option. That’s particularly problematic on property funds which Nick was particularly scathing about.

I hope ShareSoc members are better informed. Which brings me on to the subject of their AGM which was held at the Mello meeting. This was a relatively straightforward event as there were no controversies of significance, although I did suggest that with more funds in the bank they might want to hire more staff and spend more on marketing. As one of the two newly appointed directors pointed out, few investors have heard of ShareSoc although they do enormously good work in promoting the interest of private investors and in educating them. In my experience, sales of anything often relate simply to how much money is spent on marketing even if some attention has to be paid to the most cost-effective channels. But if you don’t know what works best, you just have to experiment until you find the most productive approaches.

However ShareSoc membership is growing and it’s now twice the size of UKSA with whom merger discussions are now taking place – which I wholeheartedly support incidentally. There are also discussions taking place about supporting Signet activities, who run investor discussion groups, following the recent death of John Lander who led Signet for many years.

ShareSoc is spending money though on improving their back-end membership system which will help to improve the services provided to members.

In summary this was a useful event, and like all such meetings, as useful for networking and picking up gossip as much as from learning from the formal sessions.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

Will Neil Woodford Succeed?

How long do you give a fund manager before giving up on poor performance? This is the key question faced by investors in the funds run by Neil Woodford and his Woodford Investment Management company.

Neil Woodford had a very successful record at Invesco – their High Income fund turned £10,000 into £230,000 over 25 years. In 2014 he departed to set up his own investment company and he attracted many followers to the new platform but the record since then has been very poor. For example the main LF Woodford Equity Income C Acc fund has delivered a return of -7.0 % over 3 years according to TrustNet while the stock market has in general been booming. The Woodford Patient Capital Trust which invests in smaller, early-stage companies is even worse with a share price total return of -10.7% over 3 years according to the AIC.

Woodford also run funds for Hargreaves Lansdown and St. James Place although they might have slightly different mandates. Recent articles in the FT suggest those companies still have faith in Woodford with comments about the “contrarian” approach of Mr Woodford and that it is likely to come good in the end. But will it? Has the market changed while the style of the fund manager has not? Has he simply lost his touch as a stock-picker? Over-confidence in one’s ability can be a great danger for stock-pickers. But perhaps he has just been unlucky with his stock selections?

Three years is about as long as I give fund managers before exiting completely, and I would reduce my holding in a fund before then. My decision tends to be based on my view of the investments the fund is holding. For example, the top 5 holdings in the Equity Income Fund are Barratt Developments, Imperial Brands, Burford Capital, Provident Financial and Theravance Biopharma. The last one is a one-product biopharmaceutical company with no profits, Barratt is a housebuilder when investors are fleeing the sector due to house price declines and the threat of higher interest rates, Imperial Brands is a tobacco company subject to ever tougher Government regulation, Burford Capital is a backer of law suits (a litigation funder) and Provident Financial is a consumer loans business. These are all companies that other investors might avoid so they are truly contrarian investments. The holdings of Woodford Patient Capital are even more idiosyncratic. One of the largest holdings is in Purplebricks which I have commented on negatively in the past. Investors therefore need to judge whether these kinds of investments will come good in the next year or two. I have my doubts.

Another question to be asked is whether Woodford has simply spread himself too thinly with multiple funds now under management. Does he have the same level of support from a team that he had at Invesco? Large fund managers are not one-person businesses.

One issue to look at in addition is does the fund manager have a clear investment process, i.e. do they stick to clearly stated rules or are just idiosyncratic? Is it the process that is failing or the manager’s decisions that are at fault? All fund managers make some mistakes but a look back over past investments can be a good indication of what is going wrong.

My past experience tells me that “contrarian” fund management approaches often fail. Swimming against the tide of investment trends is positively dangerous and rarely works. Incidentally I watched the Burt Lancaster film “The Swimmer” last night – a very stylish film indeed. The ending might represent the failure of dreams over reality. Perhaps Neil Woodford’s dream is fast disappearing?

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.

KIDs and New Bank Claim Platform

The rules for the production of KIDs (Key Information Documents) laid down by the EU have been severely criticised because they may give investors very misleading views on likely future returns from funds. This is because their estimate of future returns are based on short-term historic data. This has caused many fund managers of investment trusts to suggest that they should be ignored and investors look at the other data that the companies publish to get a better view of likely future returns. This writer certainly ignores the KIDs for the investment trusts I hold.

One anomaly is that KIDs are now only required for investment trusts not open-ended funds such as OEICs. Implementation for the latter was delayed and a decision has been made to delay them again. This is what the Association of Investment Companies (AIC) just said about this: “The expected delay to KIDs for UCITS funds is welcome but leaves investors in non-UCITS funds out in the cold.  Recent EU proposals to reform KIDs do not address their fundamental failings and will either do no good or make matters worse.  Investors now face being misled by KIDs for years to come. As the EU appears unwilling or unable to protect non-UCITS investors, the FCA should take the lead and warn investors not to rely on these documents.  It should ensure that the misleading information in KIDs does not pollute other areas of the market, for example by prohibiting it from being used in financial promotions and in search filters on websites.”

It’s worth pointing out that investment trusts are a peculiarly British approach to providing funds to retail investors. In effect the EU has adopted rules that prejudice investment trusts and if our future financial rules are aligned with the EU that prejudice will continue after March 2019.

Incidentally I was somewhat baffled by the furore in Parliament over disclosure of the legal advice on Brexit. The previous legal advice on Brexit was 43 pages long. The new “full” legal advice is 6 pages and does not appear to contain more information. It’s just an executive summary which highlights a few issues. So many MPs and the media are just stirring and creating dissension in my view for no good reason. Perhaps they simply have not read both documents like me.

Neil Mitchell, who has been fighting the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) over their actions over the pre-pack administration of Torex Retail for years, has launched a judicial review against the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) over their failure to disqualify certain executives of RBS involved in the activities of the Global Restructuring (GRG) at RBS. This is the group that is alleged to have connived in destroying good small companies for the benefit of RBS. It looks a difficult judicial review to get even past the first hearing by a judge to me for more than one reason from my knowledge of such cases, but I am no lawyer.

He has also launched a new Claims Management company to pursue legal claims against RBS and other banks on behalf of those aggrieved by what happened in the bank financial crisis and the activities of banks in general. The new platform has a web site here: www.banksclaimsgroup.com . Anyone who thinks they have such a claim needs to look very carefully about how this new group is to be run and financed. There are lots of lawyers keen to earn fees from pursuing such claims but whether they have a realistic prospect of success is often ignored. Also just because folks feel they have a grievance does not mean they have a winnable legal case. And as we have seen from the RBOS Shareholders Action Group, often any awards when won are can be largely diverted to litigation funders and others.

But Neil Mitchell certainly has much knowledge and experience that might be of assistance to others.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

You can “follow” this blog by clicking on the bottom right.

© Copyright. Disclaimer: Read the About page before relying on any information in this post.