Quindell and the FRC’s Role

There was a very good article written by Cliff Weight and published on the ShareSoc blog yesterday about the fines on KPMG over the audit of Quindell. Cliff points out the trivial fines imposed on KPMG in that case, the repeated failings in corporate governance at large companies and he does not even cover the common failures in audits at smaller companies. The audit profession thinks they are doing a good job, and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which is dominated by ex-auditors and accountants, does not hold them properly to account.

Perhaps they lack the resources to do their job properly. Investigations take too long and the fines and other penalties imposed are not a sufficient deterrent to poor quality audits when auditors are often picked by companies on the basis of who quotes the lowest cost.

Lots of private investors were suckered into investing in Quindell based on its apparent rapid growth in profits. But the profits were a mirage because the revenue recognition was exceedingly dubious. One of the key issues to look at when researching companies is whether they are recognizing future revenues and hence profits – for example on long-term contracts. Even big companies such as Rolls-Royce have been guilty of this “smoke and mirrors” accounting practice although the latest accounting standard (IFRS 15) has tightened things up somewhat. IT and construction companies are particularly vulnerable when aggressive management are keen to post positive numbers and their bonuses depend on them. Looking at the cash flow instead of just the accrual based earnings can assist.

But Quindell is a good example where learning some more about the management can help you avoid potential problems. Relying on the audited accounts is unfortunately not good enough because the FRC and FCA don’t seem able to ensure they are accurate and give a “true and fair view” of the business. Rob Terry, who led Quindell, had previously been involved with Innovation Group but a series of acquisitions and dubious accounting practices led to him being forced out of that company in 2003. The FT has a good article covering Mr Terry’s past business activities here: https://www.ft.com/content/62565424-6da3-11e4-bf80-00144feabdc0 . They do describe Terry as “charismatic” which is frequently a warning sign in my view as it often indicates a leader who can tell a good story. But as I pointed out in a review of the book “Good to Great”, self-effacing and modest leaders are often better for investors in the long-term. Shooting stars often fall to earth rapidly.

One reason I avoided Quindell was because I attended a presentation to investors by Innovation Group after Terry had departed. His time at the company was covered in questions so far as I recall, and uncomplimentary remarks made. They were keen to play down the past history of Terry’s involvement with the company. So the moral there is that attending company presentations or AGMs often enables you to learn things that may not be directly related to the business of the meeting, but can be useful to learn.

The ShareSoc blog article mentioned above is here: https://www.sharesoc.org/blog/regulations-and-law/the-quindell-story-and-the-frc/

Note though that subsequently the FRC have taken a somewhat tougher line in the case of the audit of BHS by PWC in 2014. Partner Steve Dennison has been fined half a million pounds and banned from auditing for 15 years with PWC being fined £10 million. But the financial penalties were reduced very substantially for “early settlement” so they are not so stiff as many would like. I fear the big UK audit firms are not going to change their ways until their businesses are really threatened as happened with Arthur Anderson in the USA over their audits or Enron. That resulted in a criminal case and the withdrawal of their auditing license, effectively putting them out of business. The UK needs a much tougher regulatory regime as they have in the USA.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Belated Action by FRC Re Autonomy

I commented previously on the conviction of former Autonomy CFO Sushovan Hussain for fraud in relation to the accounts of Autonomy Plc (see https://roliscon.blog/2018/05/02/they-do-things-differently-in-the-usa/ ). Just to show that this was not solely a case prompted by Hewlett Packard over their disastrous acquisition of the company and supported by a partisan California court as some have alleged, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have now announced formal complaints over the conduct of auditors Deloittes and senior finance staff of Autonomy – including Mr Hussain.

Allegations include: failings by the auditors to adequately challenge Autonomy’s accounting and disclosure of its purchases and sales of computer hardware; adequately to challenge Autonomy’s accounting for transactions with value added resellers (“VARs”) and to correct false or misleading communications made by Autonomy to the Financial Reporting Review Panel (“FRRP”) of the FRC.  Sushovan Hussain and Stephen Chamberlain are alleged to have breached the fundamental principle of integrity by acting dishonestly and/or recklessly when preparing and approving Autonomy’s Annual Report and Accounts for the years ended 31 December 2009 and 31 December 2010 and related charges.

There will be tribunal hearing to hear these complaints for which a date has not yet been set. It seems likely that the claims will be defended.

So 8 years later we have a non-criminal action by the regulatory authorities in the UK over accounting and audit failures while the US prosecuted for fraud. Surely this is not good enough if the allegations are true? Plus it’s been too long before action has been taken. If the claims are upheld then the accounts were wrong and sufficiently wrong not just to mislead the investors in Autonomy but to prompt Hewlett Packard to purchase the company at a grossly inflated price – that is their claim which is the subject of an on-going civil action. But it could also be seen as a fraud on stock market investors which is a criminal offence in the USA but not the UK. That is what needs changing.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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They Do Things Differently in the USA

Former Autonomy CFO Sushovan Hussain has been found guilty of 16 counts of fraud in a Federal Court in California. He was convicted on all 16 counts of wire and securities fraud. This case was based on allegations of false accounting to ramp up the value of the Autonomy business prior to its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard. The latter subsequently wrote down most of the $10.3 billion cost of that acquisition.

More background on this case is given in a previous blog post here: https://roliscon.blog/2018/02/26/autonomy-legal-case-and-revenue-recognition/

Although Autonomy was a UK public company, and the Serious Fraud Office did look at the case they decided to do nothing. However a civil action against Mr Hussain and the former Autonomy CEO, Mike Lynch (who was not indicted in the US case), is still being pursued in the English courts. This decision will clearly strengthen that action.

The US prosecutor suggested in court that the accounts were a façade and eventually proved to be an “unsustainable Ponzi scheme”. Mr Hussain is apparently likely to appeal the verdict, but he faces a prison sentence of up to 20 years – sentencing will take place on Friday.

How different to the UK where prosecutions for fraud based on false accounting almost never take place. Questions were raised about the accounts of Autonomy by investors and a whistle blower also raised issues before the sale to H/P but the UK authorities did nothing. The FRC did announce an investigation into the accounts of Autonomy in 2013. It is still listed as a “current” case on their web site, i.e. no report and no conclusions as yet. Why the delay?

This case demonstrates the typical sloth and inaction of the UK regulatory authorities in comparison with the USA. The FCA/FRC are both very ineffective, and the recent events regarding the Aviva preference shares and the collapse of Beaufort show how ineffective those bodies are in protecting the interests of investors. It’s a combination of a defective legal system and a culture of inaction and delay that permeates these organisations. Well at least that is my personal view.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Lack of Transparency at the FRC

The Financial Times ran an interesting article on Friday (13/4/2018) headlined “FRC criticised over transparency”. It reported that the Financial Reporting Council answered only 6 out of 52 Freedom of Information requests since 2013. Atul Shah, Professor of Accounting at the University of Suffolk, was reported as saying: “This shows that there is a real problem within the soul of the FRC. It is a public regulator and not a private members’ club, and it has clear duties of transparency, accountability and reliability which it has been avoiding over many years”. He went on to say they have been fobbing of public queries over a long period and that it was really shocking.

How can they reject so many requests? Because only certain parts of their operations are covered by the Freedom of Information Act and they can claim they cannot comment on on-going investigations.

The Local Authority Pension Funds Forum (LAPFF) sent a long submission to the public consultation on the Corporate Governance Code echoing many of those complaints and adding others and saying that the FRC suffers from “internal cultural problems”. They are clearly very unhappy with the activities of the FRC. The FRC has seen fit to respond with a 5-page rebuttal letter which they have published on their web site.

I have of course covered this issue of the culture and processes of the FRC in two previous blog posts which are here: https://roliscon.blog/2017/12/10/brexit-hbos-globo-and-the-frc/ and here: https://roliscon.blog/2017/11/22/standard-life-uk-smaller-companies-and-frc-meetings/

My view is that although the FRC is under-resourced, the approach that it takes should be reformed. Too many times major accounting and audit issues take years to investigate, and often simply result in no action. For smaller companies, complaints can disappear into a black hole with no response being received at all to complaints. Reform is required.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Quindell, Carillion and Brexit

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have announced that they have fined audit firm Arrandco (formerly RSM Tenon) £750,000 and the Audit Partner Jeremy Filley £56,000 in relation to the audit of the financial statements of Quindell for the 2011 accounts. They also “reprimanded” both parties and Tenon had to pay £90,000 in costs. Both parties admitted liability. Two of their errors were a “failure to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence and failure to exercise sufficient professional scepticism”. In other words, quite basic failings. The FRC is still looking into other issues that do not affect those parties.

So after seven years shareholders in Quindell have finally seen some action. But the penalties are hardly sharp enough to cause the targets any great suffering. Quindell which was primarily a claims management company, and a favourite of many private investors, had accounts that were in essence grossly misleading. For example, the FRC reported in 2015 that the restatement of its accounts in 2013 turned a post-tax profit of £83 million into a loss of £68 million. Revenue recognition of future contracted profits was one issue.

Now I never held Quindell despite having looked at it more than once. One thing that put me off was talking to someone about the previous involvement of Rob Terry, CEO of Quindell, in Innovation Group. The FT have a good article on his previous career here: https://www.ft.com/content/62565424-6da3-11e4-bf80-00144feabdc0 . I also did not like the look of the accounts at all and the recognition of revenues. Paul Scott, that well-known commentator on small companies, said yesterday: “…its accounts were fairly obviously highly suspect. Excessive debtors, excessive capitalisation into intangible assets, and a flurry of acquisitions to muddy the waters, are the usual give-aways of fake profits, so these dodgy companies are really terribly easy to spot.”

In essence, just a little background research combined with some understanding of accounting, would have put off most investors. But both private and professional investors (even institutions were fooled by Quindell) do not put in the work, or get carried away by the management and company promoters. Rob Terry has yet to be brought to account for the events at Quindell.

There was an interesting letter in the Financial Times yesterday signed by a number of people including Martin White of UKSA. It said the blame for Carillion’s demise was causing fingers to be pointed in all directions, but most are missing the real culprit – namely that faulty accounts appear to have allowed Carllion to overstate profits and capital. This enabled them to load up on debt while paying cash dividends and big bonuses to the management.

One problem again was recognition of future revenue from signed contracts, but the letter says “anticipated revenues from long-term contracts cannot count as distributable capital, and foreseeable losses and liabilities need to be taken into account”. Carillion effectively reported profit that was “anticipated”. They suggest KMPG’s audit should be investigated as I also said in a previous blog post.

The letter writers suggest that faulty standards mean that today accounts cannot be relied upon and the results for all stakeholders can be devastating. Indeed the fall-out from Carillion is going to be really horrendous with potentially thousands of small to medium size businesses that relied on sub-contract or supply work from Carillion likely to go bust. The letter writers suggest that Carillion is yet another “canary in the coal mine”. Perhaps when MPs get deluged with letters from disgruntled business owners and their out of work employees, they will actually get down and demand some reform of the accountancy and insolvency professions.

Incidentally I never held Carillion either probably because it was mainly in the “construction” sector which I avoid because of low margins, unpredictable and “lumpy” revenue and high risks of projects or contracts going wrong. It also had the Government as a major customer which can be tricky. So from a “business perspective”, such companies are bound to be risky investments.

Another good letter in yesterday’s FT was on the subject of Brexit from Dr Ian Greatorex. It said “For too long, some FT contributors have peddled the line that Brexit is the result of a “populist” backlash that might be reversed”. He restated the “remainers” causes for why they think they lost the vote, but then said “The main reason I voted to leave, often based on FT reports over the years of reported EU mess-ups, was that I believed EU institutions lacked proper democratic control and were complacently trying to create an ever-deeper political union against the instincts of the average voter………”. It’s worth reading and good of the FT to publish a more sober letter on the subject than they have been doing for some months. Perhaps the FT have finally realised that not all their readers are so opposed to Brexit and that the reason a number of educated and intelligent people supported it was for factors other than the possible trade difficulties that will need to be overcome.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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ShareSoc Takes Up Blancco Complaints

As a small shareholder in Blancco Technology Group (BLTG) I reported on the events at their AGM in a previous blog post. This company had to restate their accounts following discovery that some of the previously recognised revenues were invalid. It calls into question the competence of the past audits of the company and the management of the business.

ShareSoc has now taken up the issues and has requested both the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to investigate what happened. See this press release that ShareSoc issued for more information: https://www.sharesoc.org/sharesoc-news/sharesoc-requests-investigation-affairs-blancco-technology-group/

Shareholders in this company have lost substantial capital as a result of the failure to recognise revenue correctly, a failing all too common in IT companies and which, for some reason, auditors seem unable to spot.

If you were or are a shareholder in Blancco, you can register your interest in this matter on the ShareSoc web site so that you are informed of future news.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Brexit, HBOS, Globo and the FRC

Is it not heartening that the Brexit divorce bill, and other terms, have been settled? The exact cost is unclear but it could be up to £40 billion – a lot of money you may say! However, the fact that the key negotiators, Mrs May, Barnier et al, all looked somewhat glum about the deal when announced perhaps tells us that it was a compromise in which both sides had to concede ground. Or perhaps they were just tired. The terms of any future arrangements including trade deals still need to be worked out so it’s a long way from being concluded.

Now that £40 billion figure, sounds a lot, even if it is spread over some years. Hard line brexiteers will be unhappy. But it’s all relative. For example the annual UK Defence Budget is over £35 billion and rising. In addition, I have just read the Financial Reporting Council’s report on the HBOS audit and you can see there on page 7 that HBOS had to write off £63.3 billion in loan losses. That was only one smaller sized UK bank. According to the Bank of England, the financial crisis that affected HBOS caused £7.3 trillion of losses in total in the UK.

The report from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) on the audit of HBOS is a quite tedious and turgid document. To remind you, HBOS was a bank that almost went bust after making imprudent commercial property loans financed by short term debt. When Lehman’s collapsed and debt became difficult to raise, HBOS had to be supported by the Government and then bailed out by a merger with Lloyds TSB. The latter’s shareholders are currently pursuing a claim against the company and its directors over that event.

The reason the audit of HBOS was examined by the FRC was because the company obtained an unqualified audit report suggesting that it was a “going concern” when it soon turned out to be otherwise. These events date back to 2008 – that’s 9 years ago which shows the speed with which the FRC typically operates.

One interesting comment made in the FRC report is that it suggests on page 11 that liquidity support from central banks may be considered “a normal funding source…..and therefore reliance on such support does not mean that the bank is not a going concern…..”. As banks with a positive balance sheet are usually assumed to be eligible for “lending of last resort” from the Bank of England that might mean that HBOS would be considered to be a going concern even if it ran out of cash (which is the reason most banks go bust, not because of defective balance sheets – Northern Rock is a good example).

The report also refers on page 29 to “market expectations” at the time. Market participants did not expect the financial crisis to get worse which affected the auditor’s views. So now we know why the FRC let the auditors of HBOS (KPMG) off the hook!

As I mentioned in a blog post a couple of weeks ago (see https://roliscon.blog/2017/11/22/standard-life-uk-smaller-companies-and-frc-meetings/ ), I attended a meeting with the FRC organised by ShareSoc/UKSA. One of the issues raised was the lack of feedback from the FRC on the progress of investigations. I followed up with one of the speakers after the meeting, specifically about the case of Globo. I asked what was the status on the investigation of the audit of their accounts by Grant Thornton. As readers may know, Globo was a company that went into administration in 2015 after it was revealed that the revenue of the company was probably fictitious (see https://www.sharesoc.org/campaigns/globo/ for details). The report of the administrators made it clear that the cash on the balance sheet of Globo plc seemed to have disappeared, bringing into doubt the preceding audit report on that ground alone let alone the revenue recognition issue.

The FRC announced an investigation in December 2015, i.e. two years ago. What have the FRC been doing, when will the investigation likely conclude, are there any preliminary conclusions, etc, etc? All of these questions are very relevant as the answers might provide the basis for legal action by shareholders against the auditors and others. After several email exchanges with FRC staff, the only answer I managed to elicit is that the investigation is on-going. It has not even been turned into a “Formal Complaint”.

The reason more information could not be supplied is that it might prejudice “the overarching requirement for fairness”. My response was “I really do suggest that the FRC needs to reconsider its policies in this area. You have too much emphasis on treating those who have been complained about (i.e. auditors) fairly, while those who have complained are treated unfairly. This rather suggests, as we already knew, that the FRC is dominated by auditors who are the people it is supposed to be regulating”.

You will be amused to read in the FRC’s Publication Policy document (para. 3) that “Transparency contributes to public confidence in independent disciplinary arrangements….” but then proceeds to spell out all the restrictions it imposes that thwart it.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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