Ventus VCT AGMs – A Disappointing Result, National Grid and Sports Direct

I have mentioned previously the attempt by a shareholder in the Ventus VCTs (VEN and VEN2) to start a revolution, i.e. replace all the directors and appoint new ones. See https://tinyurl.com/y6e5fafo . Nick Curtis was the leader of the revolt but at the AGMs on the 8th August the required resolutions were narrowly defeated with one exception. This was after the boards of these companies paid a proxy advisory service £38,000 to canvas shareholders, which of course shareholders will be paying for as it is a charge on the companies.

There is a report on the meetings by Tim Grattan in the ShareSoc Member’s Area which gives more details. One surprising bit of information that came out was that the performance incentive fee payable to the manager would be paid in perpetuity even if the management agreement is terminated. This is an outrageous arrangement as it would effectively frustrate any change of manager, i.e. it’s a “poison pill” that protects the status quo.

In addition the performance fee calculation is exceedingly complex, and allegedly double counts the dividends because it is based on the sum of total return and dividends. It seems to be yet another incomprehensible performance fee arrangement which I have often see in VCTs.

Comment: I think the existing directors deserve to be removed solely for agreeing to such arrangements. I have repeatedly advocated that performance fees in investment trusts (including Venture Capital Trusts) are of no benefit to shareholders and typically just result in excessive fees being paid to fund managers. There is no justification for them. Fund managers say that they are essential to retain and motivate staff, but I do not know of any VCT where the fund manager has voluntarily given up the role because of inadequate fees being paid even though some of them have had quite dire performance.

The boards of these VCTs are reflecting on the outcome. Let us hope that they decide it is time to step down and appoint some new directors who need to be truly independent of the manager. The candidates for the board put forward by Nick Curtis are a good starting point.

If the board does not respond appropriately, then I think shareholders should pursue the matter further with another requisition for an EGM to change the directors. It can take time to educate all the shareholders in such circumstances so perseverance is essential in such campaigns.

The Financial Times had more lengthy coverage on National Grid (NG.) and its power outage last week, which I covered in a previous blog post. It seems the company is blaming the power failures on the regional distribution operators for cutting the power to the wrong people, e.g. train line operators rather than households. But they suggest otherwise. Meanwhile an article on This is Money suggests that the increased sales of electric vehicles will cause the grid to be overloaded by 2040, even though sales of such vehicles are well behind those in some other countries. They were only 2.5% of sales in the UK in 2018, versus 49% in Norway. Surely what the UK needs is more back-up capacity based on batteries, gas turbines or like the Dinorwig pumped storage power station in North Wales. That can bring large amounts of capacity on-line in seconds and is well worth a visit if you are on holiday in the area.

Other interesting news is the recent events at Sports Direct (SPD). After problems with the last audit and getting the results out, Grant Thornton have announced that they do not wish to continue as auditors. All of the big four audit firms have refused to tender for the audit and other small firms have also declined it seems. Corporate governance concerns at the company seem to be one issue.

A UK listed company does require an audit so what does the company do if there are no volunteers for the role? The FRC is being consulted apparently on how to resolve this problem. Needless to say, these issues are having a negative effect on the company’s share price.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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ProVen VCT AGM Report

I commented on the results of ProVen VCT before their AGM on my blog. I said: “Total return to shareholders was 10.3% last year, but the fund manager did even better. Of the overall profits of the company of £18.6 million, they received £7.7 million in management fees (i.e. they received 41% of the profits this year). That includes £5.6 million in performance fees. Studying the management fee (base 2.0%) and the performance fee, I find the latter particularly incomprehensible. I will therefore be attending the AGM on the 3rd July to ask some pointed questions and I would encourage other shareholders to do the same. I am likely to vote against all the directors at this company”.

I did attend the AGM on the 3rd July in London, but so far as I could tell there were only two other ordinary shareholders present. No presentations and it was a hot day in London that might have deterred some from attending. In essence picking a summer day for an AGM and not providing any special reason for them to attend is a good way to put off shareholders from doing so.

But I did meet with the Chairman, Neal Ransome, and two representatives of the fund manager before the AGM commenced to go through the performance fee figures. The performance incentive fees are based on a very complex calculation which is essentially based on the growth in net assets of the fund plus dividends paid out, i.e. on Total Return. The manager gets 20% of any excess over a hurdle rate. The hurdle rate is the higher of a 25% uplift on initial net asset value or the initial net asset value compounded by base rate plus 1% per annum. That is on top of a “base” fee of 2.0% of net assets per annum payable to fund manager Beringea.

If one is going to have a performance incentive fee, that is not an unreasonable system. But I had already told Neal that I considered all performance incentive fees should be scrapped and a simple base fee used instead (as for example Amati AIM VCT use and other VCTs used before performance fees became common). Performance fees do not improve performance because managers have a good incentive to perform to the best of their ability anyway – if they do and the fund grows they get higher fees.

One complication in the calculation of the performance fees is that they are actually calculated separately on each of seven tranches of the funds that have been raised on previous years. There is also an additional PIF performance fee related to two specific investments. In essence, the calculation is so complex that no investor in the shares of this company could ever work it out or check that it is reasonable. I hope the auditors can do so.

The reason for the exceptionally high performance fee last year was explained as being due to the very high dividends paid out, which primarily were driven by the exceptional realisations during the year. Plus some “catch-up” from previous years having passed the hurdles. VCTs cannot generally hold on to cash because the VCT rules require them to reinvest the cash quickly which can be very difficult to do so and shareholders like the tax-free dividends anyway.

Investors have done reasonably well from this VCT (comparing them with generalist VCTs reported by the AIC), but over the last 10 years the average percentage of the year end net asset value represented by overall management and administration fees is 5.5% so the manager has done very well indeed.

The AGM was a fairly trivial event with only I and one other shareholder asking any questions. I voted against the reappointment of Malcolm Moss as I don’t like fund manager representatives on boards of trusts and told the board so – he was not present in person. All the directors should be independent in trusts which he is clearly not.

I asked whether there was any difficulty with the new VCT rules which requires a focus on earlier stage companies. Response was no but there was lots of money in the market so there was lots of competition for new deals and so pricing tends to be high.

I also asked about two of the holdings that suffered large write downs. Due to reduced market multiples on retail and ecommerce companies and underperformance respectively was given as the explanation.

Another shareholders asked about a possible merger of the two ProVen VCTs but it was said there are advantages in keeping them separate – for example it enables shareholders to sell from one trust and immediately reinvest in the other when if they did that in the same trust they would lose tax reliefs.

All resolutions were passed on a show of hands vote, with no significant proxy votes against any of the resolutions except for the remuneration report (4.9% against).

Are shareholders likely to revolt over the high levels of fund management fees at this company? I doubt it, but I think the directors should tackle this issue because the fees are unreasonable. The relatively good performance of the fund manager, which may be partly from chance, tends to end up in the hands of the manager rather than the shareholders. But if the fund underperforms it’s only the shareholders that will suffer.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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Annual Charges Under MIFID II

I recently received a statement of the overall charges incurred on one of my SIPPs during 2018. This is a requirement of MIFID II so I guess I’ll be getting similar statements from other brokers I use soon.

The statement itemises all the charges paid, including one-off charges (which were zero), annual on-going charges paid on investment trust holdings and transaction charges on dealing (excluding stamp duty taxes). With a mixture of direct holdings and investment trust holdings, and a reasonably active trading style, the overall charges came to 0.36% of the portfolio.

That seems reasonable to me. How does it compare to the charges imposed by investment trusts or funds? It’s not easy to compare directly because although investment trusts and funds report an “On-going charge”, that actually excludes their dealing costs at present. But for example, the On-going Charge for one of the larger generalist investment trusts (City of London) is given as 0.41% with no performance fee. So their charges are undoubtedly higher than doing it yourself and managing your own low-cost SIPP or ISA fund (my SIPP is not in drawdown when other charges would likely be incurred such as for reviews).

But of course the additional work of managing your own portfolio may not be justified if fund charges are as low as 0.41% even with dealing costs added. Time is one of the few things most people don’t have in the modern world so they generally value it highly. So long as you can trust the fund manager and are happy with their performance, why bother with doing it yourself? But in practice many small cap or specialist funds will charge more than 1.0% and they may also impose performance fees which increases the overall cost even further.

I probably don’t need to remind readers that the impact in the long-term of an additional 1% of charges is very damaging. On a $100,000 portfolio it could reduce the return by $30,000 over 20 years. See this note published by the SEC for the details: https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_fees_expenses.pdf . Charges are important so this new information being produced as a result of MIFID may be helpful to some investors even if it costs a lot to produce and is not entirely accurate in my case – I think some rounding is taking place.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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