Tag: Lloyds TSB

The Courage to Act, or Not

Some of us have plenty of time to read good books while under house arrest. Here’s one I have been reading. It’s a memoir by Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve under the title “The Courage to Act”. It covers the major worldwide financial crisis of 2007/8 created by the defaults in sub-prime mortgages. The book includes a very good section on how that came about and how packaging up such mortgages eventually led to a complete lack of confidence in banks and other financial institutions.

Bear Stearns, a major US investment bank was one victim, but the failure of Lehman Bros which collapsed into bankruptcy had the worst impact. This was a “systemically important” bank because of its size and spread of activity and the US Government could not stop it. It demonstrated that the Federal Reserve (the US equivalent of the Bank of England), the US Treasury and other US institutions were powerless to prevent the debacle. Or at least did not have the courage to act in the face of public opposition to taxpayers bailing out financial businesses.

Another victim was AIG, the largest insurance company in the world but the reality of what happens when everyone becomes scared of the value of financial assets became very clear. Numerous “runs” on banks and savings institutions occurred.

The contagion spread worldwide and affected most large banks including those in the UK where Northern Rock had depositors queuing at their doors, and Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds were forced by the Government to take part in “recapitalisations”. It was clear that many financial businesses were grossly under-funded and had gone into more risky business sectors without increasing their capital to match.

The spectre of “moral hazard” reared its head both in the UK and USA, i.e. supporting companies that had pursued risky strategies might encourage others to do the same in future rather than discourage them. That seems to have been one reason why Lehman was abandoned to its fate, as was Northern Rock. That was despite the fact that Northern Rock appeared to have a positive asset position and hence should have qualified for “lender of last resort” loans from the Bank of England to cover a temporary cash flow shortage.

This is an interesting quotation from Bernanke’s book where clearly he changed his stance on the matter:

“You have a neighbor, who smokes in bed…..Suppose he sets fire to his house, I would say later in an interview. You might say to yourself….I’m not gonna call the fire department. Let his house burn down. It’s fine with me. But then of course, what if your house is made of wood? And it’s right next door to his house? What if the whole town is made of wood? The editorial writers of the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal [who had opposed bail-outs] in September 2008 would presumably have argued for letting the fire burn. Saving the sleeping smoker would only encourage others to smoke in bed. But a much better course is to put out the fire, then punish the smoker, and if necessary, make and enforce new rules to promote fire safety.”

The latter was what was subsequently done of course in the finance world.

Coincidentally I have seen an email from Dennis Grainger who is still campaigning for some recompense from Northern Rock shareholders who lost their savings in the nationalisation of the company. Apparently he wrote to the Prime Minister on the subject and got a response from the Treasury. You can read the letters here: https://www.uksa.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-03/NRSSAG-letter-to-PM-28-2-2020.pdf and here: https://www.uksa.org.uk/sites/default/files/2021-01/Treasury-Response-20-March-2020.pdf

The gist of what Mr Grainger says is that bearing in mind that the Government subsequently made a large profit on the transaction the shareholders should be compensated. From my knowledge of events at the time I think it was clear that the Government always expected to make a profit. The response from the Treasury provides very poor excuses for not supporting private sector offers to rescue the company. The major reason was surely not financial, but that the Labour Government and its supporters were unwilling to see any taxpayers’ money rescuing a financial institution – just like the opposition in the USA. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, also appeared to lack the “courage to act”.

The failure to support Northern Rock and subsequently Bradford & Bingley undermined the whole UK banking sector as the assets of all of them came under scrutiny and money markets closed. This caused a fall in the stock market and an economic recession.

This was indeed a very sad episode in the financial history of the world. I did of course lose money having invested in Northern Rock shares as I did not anticipate the Government and Bank of England would be so stupid as not to support the company, at least temporarily. But I probably recouped all my losses by picking up other shares that fell to very low levels and recovered in a few years (not banks though – I still do not trust their accounts!).

Bernanke’s book is well worth reading if you wish to understand the details of what happened. If anything it’s rather too detailed at 600 pages as if the author was writing for historians. But it does throw some interesting light on the events of 2008.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson  )

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Why the FCA Did Nothing About the Lloyds TSB Abuse

Those who were Lloyds TSB shareholders back in 2009 when they merged with HBOS to form Lloyds Banking Group (LLOY) thought it was bad deal at the time and it certainly turned out to be so. HBOS had many dubious loans to property companies and when the banking crisis arose they were in deep financial difficulty. There seemed very little benefit in the merger for Lloyds shareholders

Subsequently a legal action was launched by the disgruntled Lloyds TSB shareholders which was lost in the High Court in late 2019. I wrote the following to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) soon after:

“I refer to the recent judgement in the High Court in the case of SHARP and Others v BLANK and Others (the case concerning the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB). Although the judge in the case rejected the claim by shareholders in Lloyds, he made it clear in his judgement that there were significant omissions from the prospectus that was issued at the time.

Specifically he says in his Executive Summary: “But I consider that the Circular should have disclosed the existence of the ELA facility, not in terms such as would excite damaging speculation but in terms which indicated its existence”; and “Likewise, I consider that the board ought to have disclosed the Lloyds Repo. The board assumed that because at the time of its grant it had been treated by the authorities as “ordinary course” business that provided an answer to all subsequent questions. But whether it should be disclosed in the Circular as material to an informed decision was a separate question. The Court must answer that question on an objective basis. The size of the facility, the fact that it was extended in tight markets, the fact that it was linked to the Acquisition and was part of a systemic rescue package showed that this was a special contract which ought to have been disclosed”  (see paragraphs 46/47 of the Executive Summary which can be obtained from here:  https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/sharp-others-v-blank-others-hbos-judgment/

There were also possible other omissions from the disclosures which the judge did not consider but the above does provide prima facie evidence of a breach of the Prospectus Rules.  The directors of the company (Sir Victor Blank and others) would certainly have been aware of this funding and failing to disclose it was negligent.

Investors in Lloyds TSB (I was one of them) were misled by these omissions and the subsequent outcome was financially very damaging to those investors.

I suggest your organisation needs to look into these matters as a breach of the Prospectus Rules surely is a matter that makes the culprits liable to sanctions under the Rules and there is no statute of limitation in regard to these matters.”

Their response after 5 months delay can be summarised as follows:

  1. The Lloyds Circular was subject to the Listing Rules, not the Prospectus Rules. The FSA approved the Lloyds Circular under those rules.
  2. In the Judgement by Sir Alastair Norris he did not consider whether they breached the FSA rules.
  3. We will not be opening an investigation into these allegations as we are time barred from taking enforcement action (there is a 2-year limit for enforcement action).

In summary therefore, the shareholders were unable to obtain redress by civil action and the FCA proved to be toothless to deal with this matter also. It is very regrettable that the protection that shareholders believed they had against the abuse of directors not acting in their interests proved to be imaginary.

Shareholders were not given all the information to which they were entitled and that fact alone merited action by the FCA. But they have declined to pursue it. Considering the similar case of the Royal Bank of Scotland Rights Issue in 2008, it is very clear that shareholders should not rely on what is said in prospectuses or circulars.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson  )

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Lloyds Case Impressions, Ideagen AGM and Return on Capital

Yesterday I attended the Annual General Meeting of Ideagen (IDEA) at 12.00 noon in the City of London – see below – and afterwards spent an hour in the High Court listening to one of the witnesses being cross-examined in the Lloyds Banking Group case. What follows is just an impression of the scene because the whole case is running for months so in no way can this be considered a comprehensive report. I have covered some more details of the case in previous articles, but to remind you the litigants are suing Lloyds and the former directors of the company over the takeover of HBOS which they declare was contrary to their interests as shareholders in Lloyds TSB. Lloyds deny liability.

The case is being heard in the Rolls Building in New Fetter Lane – a modern building very different to the ultra Victorian main Courts of Justice building in the Strand. See this link for a video tour of the building: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-court/high-court/the-rolls-building/virtual-tour/

The witness being cross-examined on the day was Tim Tookey, the former Finance Director of Lloyds TSB. Richard Hill QC was undertaking the task for the litigants under the eyes of a single judge, Mr Justice Norris (sans wig). It was a pretty impressive scene with at least 6 barristers in wigs and gowns plus about another 10 supporting legal staff. Why do barristers still wear wigs? To quote from the web: “The courts didn’t officially add wigs to the legal dress code until the 18th century when they became culturally chic. … They continue to wear them because nobody has ever told them to stop”.

It was a pretty impressive scene, somewhat lost on the few members of the public present – half a dozen litigants and members of the press. But the court was digitally up to date with every desk holding a screen on which the written evidence was displayed as it was invoked. However the witness being cross examined still referred to a paper copy, extracted from 150 large A4 binders stored in shelves on the left hand side of the court – filling almost the whole wall.

Mr Tookey gave his responses to questions firmly and without emotion. A confident witness giving clear answers. He was questioned about the events leading up to the announcement of the acquisition of HBOS and over how much capital Lloyds anticipated would be required to ensure the deal was “bullet-proof” (i.e. not creating unacceptable risks if the economic circumstances worsened). He was questioned about the extent the risks had been considered and whether enough due diligence on HBOS had been done before the decision was taken to proceed. Apparently it came down to a decision at 4.00 am on a Monday morning to proceed. They we being forced to decide to proceed or not by the Government before the markets opened on Monday. But he said that he thought all the risks had been considered and the board was supportive of the deal because of the strategic advantages of the HBOS takeover in the longer term. Recapitalisation involving the Government was necessary because there was no way it was possible to raise even £3 billion (underwritten) by the Monday, which was the minimum requirement. Government involvement “de-risked” the deal. The case continues….. for another dozen weeks.

One can see from the above exactly why the costs of such cases are so enormous.

Ideagen AGM

Ideagen (IDEA) is a software company in the Governance, Risk and Compliance sector. I have held the shares for some years when it has grown revenue and profits considerably, both from acquisitions and organic growth. They have a strong emphasis on the importance of recurring revenue. They are presenting at the ShareSoc Seminar on the 8th November, although that event is fully booked I understand.

There were fewer sharesholders at the Ideagen AGM than members of the public at the Lloyds hearing, but that’s not exceptional for small companies. But it was still a useful event – a brief report follows.

One question I raised was about return on capital. Now you might think this was prompted by an interesting article on that subject by Leon Boros in the latest ShareSoc Newsletter, but I did not get around to reading that until later in the day so it’s somewhat of a coincidence. Leon compared the return on capital at Bioventix (one of his favourite stocks which he likes to talk about regularly), and YouGov. He pointed out that not only are measures such as Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Return on Assets (ROA) better at Bioventix calculated on the headline numbers, but that those for YouGov are somewhat doubtful because they capitalise and amortise the cost of recruitment of their survey panels. Plus they capitalise and amortise software development costs. But they then produce adjusted earnings figures that excluded the amortisation of both those costs, effectively pretending they are not real costs. He has a point.

Now I always look at returns on capital when I am investing in new companies because I consider it one of the most important measures of a company’s performance – as I told the directors of Ideagen. Hence at the Ideagen AGM I asked a question on that subject. On page 18 of their Annual Report they give the “Key Performance Indicators”, 9 of them, that the directors use to monitor the performance of the company. They all look good, but none of them measure return on capital. Should they not include a return on capital measure?

In reality the headline figures for ROE, ROCE and ROA reported by Stockopedia for Ideagen are all less than 2%, and that ignores even the large number of shares under option that the company has that would dilute the earnings. The reason for this is partly the fact that the profit measures used are “unadjusted” and as the company has very substantial amortisation of goodwill from past acquisations, and £1.2 million of share-based payment charges, these distort the numbers. The CEO David Hornsby, responded with “what measure would I like to use?” to which I responded that I did not mind so long as it was consistent from year-to-year. Companies often publish such figures, which are frequently based on “adjusted” profits. I also suggested cash return on assets might be a good measure, something I also look at.

The company actually generated Net Cash From Operating Activities of £8.3m last year which on Net Assets of £30m at the start of the year is very respectable, although technically one should probably write back the cost of past acquisitions that have been written off. In addition some of the cash generated was spent on contingent consideration on past acquistions and on “development costs” which they class as “investing activities”. This demonstrates that for some businesses, looking at headline return on capital figures or those reported by financial web sites can be misleading. One needs to look at the detail to get a real understanding on what is going on in such a business.

A short debate on the issue followed. Otherwise after a couple of other questions, the CEO mentioned the half year for the company ends today, and shareholders should be very pleased with the results.

In summary, a short AGM meeting, but a useful one. And the ShareSoc newsletter is well worth reading – it even includes some articles from me.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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ADVFN Results and More on Lloyds

ADVFN Plc (AFN) published their results for the year to June yesterday. I have a very small holding in the company (acquired for reasons I won’t go into). ADVFN are information providers on the stock market, primarily to private investors. Many people monitor their bulletin boards although like many such boards frequented by private investors, they are somewhat of a curate’s egg so far as serious or sophisticated investors are concerned.

But they certainly have a large following – they say they have 4 million registered users. Does this enormously large mailing list ensure they have a profitable business? In reality no.

Indeed last year they barely managed to break even (£47k operating profit) on £8.2 million of turnover. That is however a massive improvement on the previous year when they lost £650k on similar revenues.

At least they showed postive cash flow but the net assets of the company are £1.7 million so they have a long way to go before they show a decent return on the capital employed. Current liabilities also exceed current assets. At least they have changed their strategy so as to stop further investing with a focus on “profits rather than growth”.

Regretably this kind of business model just shows that private investors are reluctant to pay money for good information provision. Folks can sign up a lot of “free subscribers”, which is no doubt ADVFN’s customer base, by spending money on marketing but monetising those eyeballs is another matter altogether. Relying on advertising to do so is also getting more difficult as Google and social media platforms are tending to dominate that market.

The other moral of this story is that one needs to be wary of investing in companies with unproven business models. It’s easy to spin a good story about the enormous demand for a given service, but the real proof of the pudding is when the model generates profits (and cash as well of course). Companies like Uber and Deliveroo appear to be chasing the same mirage. Lots of people like the services and are willing to pay their low prices, but whether they can compete profitably is another matter.

Lloyds TSB/HBOS case. My previous blog post was on the topic of the current legal case being heard in the High Court. One of the witnesses called in the case is Hector Sants, former head of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) at the time of the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds. His evidence is to be heard in secret, for reasons unknown. Indeed, even the fact that this was to be so, was kept secret until challenged by media organisations.

Why is this relevant? Because it was suggested at the time that without the takeover of HBOS, Lloyds would not have had to raise extra capital (and it was that which diluted shareholders interests). But the FSA told them they would still have to raise more capital even if they did not proceed with the takeover. Some shareholders allege that this was a forceful encouragement by the Government to go ahead, regardless of the interests of their shareholders. Perhaps that might have been in the public interest, as was similarly argued on the re-capitalisation of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and other banks, which was effectively a partial nationalisation. But many shareholders are more concerned with their own immediate interests rather than the public interest although it could possibly be argued that ensuring no melt-down of the UK financial sector took place was also in their interests. So Mr Sants evidence might be very revealing about the motives and actions of the Government, but the public may not learn much about it, even at this late date.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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HBOS and Lloyds Legal Case

This week sees the start of the legal case in the High Court by investors in the Lloyds TSB over the acquisition of HBOS – opening submissions are on Wednesday and it’s scheduled to run through to March next year. Anyone can attend these hearings of course but I think it will take a very patient person to sit through all of it. I have submitted written evidence on behalf of the litigants (represented by Harcus Sinclair) but it seems I am unlikely to be called for cross-examination by the defence which is somewhat disappointing.

I cannot comment further for that reason, but the claim is in essence based on the allegation that relevant information was not disclosed in the prospectus that was issued at the time in 2008 when investors in Lloyds TSB approved the deal. Lloyds reject that the claim has a sound basis, but the cross examination of former directors Sir Victor Blank, Eric Daniels and Truett Tate should provide some excitement and will no doubt be assiduously reported upon by the press. The directors who signed off the prospectus are of course defendents in the litigation as well as the company.

This is a similar case to that of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) litigation which was recently settled before it got into court, which is the way these matters often end up. Sky News has reported that Harcus Sinclair have offered to settle the case but that has been rejected by Lloyds. As in the RBS case, legal costs on both sides will no doubt be enormous.

Lloyds Banking Group are also involved in claims over the activities of management in HBOS (particularly in the Reading branch) which has resulted in the conviction of several people for fraud. The FT Magazine ran a very good, and lengthy, article on this subject in their October 7th edition. In summary this was where people exploited the fact that businesses in financial difficulty, who were dependent on loans from the bank, via consultancy fees and other strategies extracted large sums of money or gained control of businesses from the original owners. Large numbers of business owners lost their companies and in some cases were forced into poverty as result. This disgraceful episode was very similar to the activities of the Global Restructuring Group at RBS which I covered in a previous article, but will not be raised in the current legal proceedings. Lloyds are compensating the people affected, at least to some extent.

Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )

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